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INTRODUCTION
To encourage the development of the great natural resources of a
country[,] trifling inconveniences to particular persons must sometimes
1
give way to the necessities of a great community.

Appalachia is poor because of, and in spite of, its wealth of natural
resources. Coal has made, and kept, the people of Appalachia poor.
Those who have benefited from coal should now repay the people of
Appalachia.
For decades, the four-state Appalachian coal fields region has been
2
the poorest in this nation. The percentage of persons below the
poverty level in the coal counties is nearly twice the national average,
with a median household income of between one half and two-thirds
3
of the national average. “The great irony is that [the Appalachian
region] contains some of the nation’s richest resources and its

1. Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 459 (Pa. 1886).
2. The Central Appalachian Coal Fields comprise the following counties:
(Kentucky) Bell, Breathitt, Carter, Clay, Elliott, Estill, Floyd, Harlan, Jackson,
Johnson, Knott, Knox, Laurel, Lawrence, Lee, Letcher, Magoffin, Martin, Menifee,
Morgan, Owsley, Perry, Pike, Powell, Rockcastle, Rowan, Wayne, Wolfe, Whitley;
(Tennessee) Anderson, Campbell, Claiborne, Morgan, Scott; (Virginia) Buchanan,
Dickenson, Lee, Russell, Tazewell, Wise; (West Virginia) Boone, Braxton, Clay,
Fayette, Kanawha, Lincoln, Logan, McDowell, Mercer, Mingo, Nicholas, Raleigh,
Summers, Webster, Wyoming. RONALD L. LEWIS, BLACK COAL MINERS IN AMERICA:
RACE, CLASS, AND COMMUNITY CONFLICT 1780-1980 214 n.1 (Univ. of Ky. Press 1987).
3. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the median household income in 1997
in the United States was $37,005, with 13.3% of persons below the poverty level. See
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS, at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2002). A
survey of three counties representative of the coal mining regions of Appalachia
exemplifies the contrasting poverty levels of the Appalachian region and the rest of
the United States. In Buchanan County, Virginia, the median household income was
$25,812 with a poverty level of 24.7%. See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU STATE AND
COUNTY QUICKFACTS, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51/51027.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2002). McDowell County, West Virginia had an median income of
$18,592 with a poverty level of 31.4%. See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU STATE AND
COUNTY QUICKFACTS, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/54/=54047.html
(last visited Mar. 20, 2002). Letcher County, Kentucky had a median income of
$22,893 with a poverty level of 26.1%. See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU STATE AND
COUNTY QUICKFACTS, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/ qfd/states/21/21133.html
(last visited Mar. 20, 2002). A quick look at previous census results shows that the
poverty contrast has existed for a number of years. According to the 1990 Census,
five census tracts in Buchanan County, Virginia, had 20.3 to 27.8% of residents below
the poverty level. Cathy St. Clair, Renewal Community Program Meeting Set, THE
VIRGINIA MOUNTAINEER, Sept. 27, 2001, at 1. From 1960 to 1965 three-fourths of the
families in Eureka Hollow, a coal town in McDowell County, West Virginia, had
incomes below the federal poverty level of $3,000 per year. BILL PETERSON,
COALTOWN REVISITED: AN APPALACHIAN NOTEBOOK 5-6 (Henry Regnery Co. 1972). In
1965, six of the ten poorest counties in America were located in the Kentucky coal
fields. JACK E. WELLER, YESTERDAY’S PEOPLE xii-xiii (Univ. of Ky. Press 1965).
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4

poorest people.” The Appalachian coal fields of eastern Kentucky,
southwestern Virginia, southern West Virginia, and northwestern
Tennessee comprise an area that is more homogeneous than any of
these states taken as a whole. It has been argued that the residents of
this region would be better off if these counties were united into one
state of Appalachia, so that the power and profit could remain in the
5
region.
Coal mining is essentially the only industry in the region. The
economic dependence on the coal mining industry combined with
the devastating environmental and health effects associated with coal
mining, have resulted in unusable real estate, lower education levels,
and a generally lower standard of living than anywhere else in this
6
country.
These conditions, however, have resulted in millions of dollars in
profits for the large coal mining companies and a significant
contribution to the industrial development and wealth of this
country. Coal generates more than fifty-one percent of the electricity
7
in this country. Coal fueled the industrial development of the
8
Nearly eighty percent of the coal
United States after 1890.
consumed in this country was extracted from the Appalachian
9
Mountains. The Appalachians have been effectively used as an
economic colony of the industrial northeast, sapping its mineral and
10
timber wealth.
This Article suggests that it is time to repay the people who
suffered at the hands of the coal mining companies, and who assisted

4. PETERSON, supra note 3, at 19; see also WELLER, supra note 3, at xii-xiii
(underscoring the ironic nature of the contrast between actual income and
profitability of the Appalachian region by noting that eastern Kentucky land
companies were the most profitable of America’s corporations).
5. See GEORGE VECSEY, ONE SUNSET A WEEK viii (Saturday Rev. Press, E.P. Dutton
& Co., Inc. 1974) (discussing the author’s interactions with coal miners and his
conclusion that the single state of Appalachia should only consist of the coal-bearing
portions of Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and West Virginia).
6. See generally WELLER, supra note 3, at xiii (quoting Arnold Toynbee, an
English historian, who compared the Appalachian people to barbarians and accused
them of relapsing into “illiteracy and witchcraft” and suffering from “poverty, squalor
and ill-health”).
7. Fred Freme, United States Coal Supply and Demand: 2000 Review, United States
Energy Information Administration (2001) (providing a statistical analysis of the
sources of electricity in the United States in 2000: coal 51.4%, nuclear 19.9%, hydro
7.1%, gas 16.3%, and petroleum and other 5.2%), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/special/feature.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2002).
AND
D.
ELLER,
MINERS,
MILLHANDS,
MOUNTAINEERS,
8. RONALD
INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE APPALACHIAN SOUTH, 1880-1930 128 (Univ. of Tenn.
Press, Knoxville 1982).
9. Id.
10. Id. at xix.
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in the industrial development of the entire country. One suggested
form of repayment is reparations from the federal government,
11
funded by the coal companies. The federal government has set a
precedent by paying reparations to disparaged groups, and should do
at least as much for the Appalachians who have suffered this
historical injustice. Billions of dollars have been paid to Japanese
Americans, Native Americans, and Hawaiian Natives, for the injustices
12
The families of the coal workers are no less
done to them.
deserving. Regardless of which coal company is at fault and what
percentage of harm was caused by each, the harm to the Appalachian
mountaineer is undeniable. Reparations could be used by town and
local governments to construct schools, airports, roads, and other
infrastructure to improve the standard of living and encourage new
industries to relocate to Appalachia.
I.

HISTORY
13

Life has never been easy in the Appalachian coal fields. Between
14
1865 and 1915, eastern Kentucky was torn by clan wars. The most
famous battles were between the Hatfields of Logan County, West
15
Virginia and the McCoys of Pike County, Kentucky. The Hatfields
often crossed the border to vote in Kentucky elections, as well as the
West Virginia elections, thereby doubling their voting power. Tolbert
McCoy stabbed Big Ellison Hatfield to death at a voting precinct in
1882. When Tolbert and his brothers were arrested, a band of
Hatfields took the prisoners from the custody of the law officers and
shot them. The McCoys retaliated with murderous raids into West
16
Virginia, followed by retaliatory raids into Kentucky by the Hatfields.
Every county had its feud at this time, caused in part by the
independence, disdain for religion, and lack of education of the

11. See infra Part XII (discussing the prospect of reparations as a remedy for the
devastation caused to Appalachia by coal mining).
12. See Art Alcausin Hall, There is a Lot to be Repaired Before We Get to Reparations: A
Critique of the Underlying Issues of Race that Impact the Fate of African American Reparations,
2 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. MINORITY ISSUES 1, 13-18 (2000) (discussing the history
and reasoning behind reparations given to such groups) .
13. HARRY M. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS x-xi (Brown & Co.
1963) (providing a brief summary of the hardships his own family suffered as
mountaineers). Indeed, such revelations were recognized by the Supreme Court. See
Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., 498 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1012,
1013-18 (1976) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that certiorari should be granted
because petitioners were victimized by owners of mineral rights and their raping of
the Appalachian land in the same fashion recalled in Caudill’s novel).
14. See CAUDILL, supra note 13, at 46-51.
15. Id. at 47-48.
16. Id.
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17

mountain dwellers.
These feuds were not the only problem for the Appalachians.
Exploitation by more sophisticated neighbors began in the 1870s, as
the wealth of timber in eastern Kentucky and the other Appalachian
18
states became known. Until this time, mountaineers occasionally
would cut down a tree and float it downriver in exchange for a dollar
19
or two. In the 1870s, northeastern businessmen came to Kentucky
and purchased growing trees for forty to seventy-five cents each, in
many cases with the right to leave the tree growing until the
20
businessmen needed the tree. These timber sales provided the only
cash in the region. The dangerous work of felling huge trees,
21
however, killed and maimed many of the mountain people.
A. Severance of Mineral Rights
By 1885, northeastern businessmen had exploited much of the
timber and moved on to mineral acquisition. The northeastern
businessmen did not buy the land in fee, which would have created a
tax liability. Instead, they bought only the rights to the underlying
22
minerals, including coal, gas, and oil. The businessmen hired men
23
of sophistication and charm to flatter the mountaineers. Less than
24
twenty-five percent of mineral deeds were signed by literate sellers.
The sellers relied on the savvy buyers for an explanation of the
contents of the deeds, the terms of which were to “prove deadly to
25
the welfare of generations of the mountaineer’s descendants.”
These “broad form deeds” authorized the buyer to excavate the
minerals in any way seen fit. Additionally, the broad form deeds
allowed the buyers to build roads and structures on the land as they
needed, and often contained a release of any liability for damage to

17. See id. at 46-51 (discussing the general cause of each major clan war that
occurred in the Kentucky mountain counties).
18. See id. at 63 (stating that the mountaineer was often duped into thinking that
his timber was particularly worthless, and as a result, would sell it to a merchant or
politician for a price far below its fair value).
19. See id. at 67-69 (describing the process of gathering the logs, floating them
downstream, and the little compensation received in return).
20. Id. at 68.
21. Id. at 69 (discussing the dangers that arose in the process of bringing the logs
downstream, which often resulted in physical harm as well as the provocation of
thievery).
22. See id. at 72 (noting that by limiting his rights to the minerals, the profiteer
was able to minimize tax liability).
23. See id. at 75 (observing that the minerals were often sold for nominal
consideration in a fashion similar to that of the sale of timber).
24. Id. at 74.
25. Id.
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26

the surface land.
John C.C. Mayo was one of the first to create and exploit the broad
27
form deed.
Mayo raised $450 in capital and began acquiring
mineral rights in Kentucky. Eventually these rights made him the
28
He bought
richest and most powerful coal baron of his time.
hundreds of thousands of acres of mineral rights in eastern Kentucky
29
at a price ranging between fifty cents and six dollars per acre. Other
30
buyers paid prices of twenty-five cents to three dollars per acre.
“Some mountaineers were reported to have sold entire mountains
31
rich in coal and timber for a mule, saddle horse, or a hog rifle.”
Many local residents viewed Mayo as a hero, as they saw little value
32
in their mineral rights and thus were eager to sell. This eagerness
resulted in out-of-state investors owning a majority of the land and
33
mineral rights in Appalachia. In 1900, out-of-state investors owned
ninety percent of the coal in Mingo and Wayne Counties, West
34
Virginia. By 1910, out-of-state investors owned a major portion of
eastern Kentucky. At least eighty-five percent of the minerals had
been sold, and out-of-state investors owned seventy-five percent of the

26. See Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 304-07 (Ky. 1987) (noting that the
mineral owner is granted extensive authority, but such authority does not permit
mining that is oppressive, arbitrary, wanton, or malicious).
27. See Robert M. Pfeiffer, Kentucky’s New Broad Form Deed Law—Is It
Constitutional?, 1 J. MIN. L. & POL’Y 57, 61 (1985-86) (observing that the history of the
broad form deed is essentially the story of Mayo). See generally Robert H. Eardley, The
Broad Form Deed Amendment: Does it Still Have a Purpose? An Analysis of the Broad Form
Deed Amendment in Light of Ward v. Harding, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 101,
102 (1997) (summarizing the story of Mayo).
28. See Pfeiffer, supra note 27, at 61 (noting Mayo’s wealth was the result of his
expansive acquisitions of land); see also Eardley, supra note 27, at 103 (stating that
Mayo was the richest person in Kentucky at the time of his death).
29. See Pfeiffer, supra note 27, at 61 n.14. After purchasing the mineral rights for
a pittance compared to the worth of the coal, Mayo would often hand the selling wife
a five-dollar gold piece as a gift. This coin may have been the only money ever
owned by the woman, and some were preserved for decades as family heirlooms,
shown to visitors as “John Mayo Money.” HARRY M. CAUDILL, THEIRS BE THE POWER:
THE MOGULS OF EASTERN KENTUCKY 69 (1983) (discussing Mayo’s ability to win the
favor of the locals through generosity that some people considered “legendary”).
30. ELLER, supra note 8, at 56.
31. Id.
32. See id. (noting that mountaineers were unaware of the immense value of the
natural resources of their land, and because the land was so abundant, often took the
land for granted).
33. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text; see also ELLER, supra note 8, at 6263 (noting that men such as Mayo acquired great prosperity by purchasing land and
resources for low prices from local residents and then selling them to outside
corporations for a large profit, ultimately resulting in “hand[ing] over the region’s
economy and its future absentee control”).
34. See ELLER, supra note 8, at xxi-xxii (asserting that outside businessmen took
over large portions of the Appalachian region, resulting in local interest becoming
inferior to outside corporate interests).
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35

saleable timber.
Using common mining methods available during this time period,
the coal operator was able to extract between 1,000 to 1,500 tons of
36
coal per acre, for each foot in depth of coal seam. In many areas,
this seam was up to five feet thick, meaning the operator could
recover 5,000 tons per acre, and as much as 20,000 tons if more than
37
one seam was mined. Rights that had been purchased for several
38
dollars per acre were worth thousands of dollars per acre by 1930.
If sellers were less eager to sell their land, the northeastern
businessmen resorted to tactics such as resurrecting old titles that
39
often conflicted with newer titles to the settlers. The businessmen
hired legal counsel to challenge the deeds of the settlers, resulting in
a “long series of legal battles . . . threatening the security of many
40
persons who had actually settled the lands of the counties.”
A
common method used by some developers was to acquire the rights
of a single heir when property was left to several heirs, and then
request a court to partition the land when the other heirs refused to
41
sell. When the court found this option inequitable, the court would
order a public auction, at which time the out-of-state investor
42
undoubtedly would be the high bidder. At one such sale in 1889, a
major developer was able to purchase 2000 acres at auction for
43
$200.
As a result, by the early decades of the twentieth century, land
ownership in the Appalachians was concentrated in huge coal
companies and investors, unlike coal areas in other states where
44
independent operators owned the land they mined.
This

35. See CAUDILL, supra note 13, at 75 (discussing the transfer of much of the
Appalachian land to non-residents).
36. A coal seam is a layer of coal located between rock layers that may cover acres
See id. (explaining that mountaineers sold their land for a
of land.
disproportionately low value given the vast amount of minerals that could be
obtained from each acre).
37. See id. (noting that despite the great mineral wealth the land provided, the
mountaineer typically received compensation of no more than a half-dollar).
38. See generally id.
39. ELLER, supra note 8, at 52 (explaining that the speculators capitalized on the
typically “obscure” land titles of the mountaineers).
40. Id. (quoting EDWIN ALBERT CUBBY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TUG AND
GUYANDOT VALLEYS: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN WEST VIRGINIA,
1888-1921 180 (1962) (Ph.D. dissertation)).
41. See id. at 56-57 (detailing the way in which some capitalists would take
advantage of obscure land titles in the mountain regions and of their greater access
to the court system).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 57.
44. Id. at 72 (noting that ownership by large coal companies was characteristic of
the Appalachian region).
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concentration of land ownership resulted in an exploitative attitude
by coal operators who would simply move on to other regions after
45
devastating the Appalachians.
B. Nominal Amounts Paid for Mineral Rights
The devastation of Appalachia began with the grants of timber
rights in the late 1800s, when landowners found a source of easy cash
46
in their trees.
The devastation became more drastic with the
47
severance of mineral rights. Landowners granted the rights to mine
48
coal for nominal amounts, and often waived the right of the surface
owner to recover damages for subjacent support, pollution, or other
49
damages to the surface land, spring or well water, or their homes.
For example, in 1923, a Virginia deed conveyed mineral rights in
seven tracts of land, three of which comprised 319 acres, and four of
50
which were of indeterminate size, for a total fee of $25.
Earlier examples of severance of mineral rights include an 1874
lease that granted all mineral rights in 1,000 acres for 99 years, for
51
the rental fee of ten cents per ton that was never paid. Similarly, an
1890 lease granted rights for 999 years to all of the coal in 112.3 acres
of a Kentucky property for one dollar per acre for the fee interest in
the coal plus two dollars per acre to lease the surface under which the
52
coal lay. In 1880, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad bought over
21,000 acres of mineral rights in Wise County, Virginia, for thirty-five
53
cents per acre. Yet another example involved a 999 year lease of

45. See id. (asserting that the companies were mainly interested in making a
profit, and this would encourage establishing as many coal operations as possible on
the property, leading to the “gluttonous exploitation of the region’s coal deposits
and to the overdevelopment of the industry itself”).
46. See id. at 93-127 (providing a detailed discussion of the “timber boom” of
1890-1920, where outside lumber companies acquired much of the timberlands in
Appalachia and caused the destruction of a great deal of mountain forests in the
region).
47. CAUDILL, supra note 13, at 70-77.
48. See ELLER, supra note 8, at 56 (commenting that land rich in mineral deposits
sold for anywhere from twenty-five cents to three dollars per acre).
49. See CAUDILL, supra note 13, at 72-75 (noting that mountaineers often signed
deeds passing title to the minerals underlying the land to coal companies without
realizing that the deed often also conveyed a variety of other privileges and
immunities, such as absolving the coal company from all liability to the landowner
for any damages to the land that might occur as a result of the mining operations).
50. Shores v. Shaffer, 146 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1966).
51. Heirs of Roberts v. Coal Processing Corp., 369 S.E.2d 188 (Va. 1988).
52. Johnson v. Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., 311 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ky.
1958); see also Bentley v. Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., 311 S.W.2d 540, 540 (Ky.
1958) (holding that the instrument was not void merely because it failed to state
whether payment for rental was to be made in a lump some or in installments).
53. See ELLER, supra note 8, at 49 (discussing General John Daniel Imboden, one
of the first and most zealous promoters of coal development in the southern
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coal executed in Kentucky in 1888 that included a rental fee of two
dollars per acre, effectively selling the mineral rights in forty acres for
54
$82.50. Likewise, a Kentucky barber reported that his grandfather
sold “a whole valley seven miles long, from ridge to ridge, including
the virgin timber and seven seams of coal for $300 and a saddle
55
horse.”
A 1902 Virginia deed transferred mineral rights in 1,423 acres, with
56
The deed permitted the
typical broad form deed language.
company to enter onto the land and use the surface “in all or any
manner that may be deemed necessary or convenient for mining . . .
or otherwise utilizing all or any of the said coal . . . without liability
57
for injury to the surface of said land.” The grantor involved in this
deed was an illiterate confederate veteran who received only one
dollar per acre for a tract of 1,019 acres, and four dollars per acre for
58
a tract of 404 acres, for a total of $2635. Similarly, a 1904 deed
granted the mineral rights in 702 acres to a coal company, for $1170,
59
and a bond for $2340, plus 140 shares of stock in the purchaser.
The deed granted all coal, oil, and gas, and all timber over 16 inches
diameter, together with such roads, chutes, and other devices “as is
necessary for the successful mining and manufacturing and removing
60
said coal.”
These nominal prices for valuable assets were one factor
contributing to the devastation of Appalachia. Farmers saw no value
in the steeply sloping hills behind their farms and sought the comfort
61
of a few dollars. The descendants of these farmers later had to
contend with the flooding caused by strip mining, the pollution
caused by coal dust, and the subsidence caused by removal of the
coal, as well as other damage to their health, homes, and
62
environment.

mountains).
54. Terrill v. Ky. Block Cannel Coal Co., 160 S.W.2d 326, 327 (Ky. 1942).
55. JACK E. WELLER, YESTERDAY’S PEOPLE 15 (1965).
56. See CAUDILL, supra note 13, at 74 (noting that although lawyers often referred
to deeds which merely passed title to the minerals under the land as “short-form
deeds,” in fact they were “broad form” as they “conveyed a great number of specific
contractual privileges and immunities” in addition to the mineral rights).
57. Phipps v. Leftwich, 222 S.E.2d 536, 537-38 (Va. 1976).
58. See id. at 538-39 (holding that because strip mining was unknown in that area
at the time of the execution of the deed, the parties did not intend to allow strip
mining, and thus those owning the mineral rights could not remove the coal by this
method).
59. Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 24 S.E.2d 559, 561 (Va. 1943).
60. Id. at 561.
61. ELLER, supra note 8, at 54-56.
62. See generally CAUDILL, supra note 13, at 305-24.
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C. Mining Begins
In the early days of coal mining in Appalachia, it appeared that the
new industry would bring prosperity to the region. New railroads
were constructed to connect the newly developed towns and to
deliver the coal. Many of the coal owners also owned portions of the
63
railroads.
Railroads were constructed in preparation for removing vast
64
amounts of coal. Next, coal towns were built, with homes for the
miners, a commissary or camp store, and a rudimentary
65
schoolhouse. The miners’ homes varied in quality depending on
the size of the mining operation, but many were superior in
66
construction to the homes of the mountaineers. The miners were
paid in cash only once per month, but the bookkeeper of the mine
would issue scrip, coins minted by the coal company, for the time
67
already worked by the miner. This scrip could only be used at the
camp store, ensuring that most of the salary earned by the miners was
retained by the coal company. Often the miner had already taken
most of his pay in scrip before payday arrived, so there was little real
68
cash to spend elsewhere.
69
Injuries were frequent and devastating in the early days of mining.
Roof collapses, electrocution, crushing injuries, and explosions
70
disabled or killed many. Miners who were injured, and the families
of miners who were killed, were ejected from the coal camps, and
formed shantytowns in the outlying rural areas surrounding the
71
camps.

63. See ELLER, supra note 8, at 73 (noting that land companies profited not only
by owning the mineral rights in the Appalachian region, but also by controlling the
transportation of the coal).
64. See id. at 65-85 (discussing the coming of the railroad to the Appalachian
region in order to tie the “natural and human resources of rural areas to the
industrialized core”).
65. See CAUDILL, supra note 13, at 98-101 (noting that in the more developed coal
towns there could also be a hospital or clinic, a recreation hall, a hotel, and an
administrative building).
66. See id. at 99 (“The mountaineer had never experienced such quality
construction and few of them had ever so much as seen a plastered wall. Compared
to his cabins and crudely built frame houses the residences [in the coal towns] were
indeed enticing.”).
67. See id. at 114 (explaining that the scrip helped ease the burden imposed by
the infrequency of paydays, allowing the miner to acquire the necessities needed
before the end of the month).
68. Id. (noting that the scrip was what most miners lived on and therefore most
only acquired a few dollars in “real money” each payday).
69. Id. at 118.
70. See id. at 119-21 (noting that many deaths resulted but there is no record of
the exact number).
71. See id. at 121-22 (remarking that coal companies made little to no attempt to
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When the Kentucky coal mines began operations around 1915,
unskilled miners who picked and shoveled the coal earned $1.50 for
a ten-hour day. By 1927, wages had risen to $4 for an eight-hour day,
72
as a result of increases in the selling price of coal. Although the
prices at the commissary were also rising, this was a prosperous time
for miners and it was not unusual for a miner to own appliances like
refrigerators or washing machines, and even a Model T Ford was
73
within his means.
The population of Appalachia grew dramatically between 1880 and
74
1920. The coal counties of the four-state region had a population of
75
During this
410,781 in 1880, which grew to 1,235,869 by 1920.
period, coal production increased five-fold, to where nearly eighty
percent of the total national coal production in 1930 was from
76
Appalachia.
77
In the 1880s, the average Appalachian farm was 187 acres. By
78
1930, the size had been reduced to only forty-seven acres.
Additionally, production of swine, a principle source of food,
79
declined to thirty-nine percent of its former level. The destruction
of the American Chestnut trees by blight removed the main source of
inexpensive feed for swine. Although the American Chestnut blight
played a significant role in the decline of pork production, mining
80
This
had replaced farming as the predominant industry.
dependence on a single industry continues in Appalachia today and
is the cause of many of the region’s problems.
The Great Depression hit the mountain region harder than most
81
areas. When President Roosevelt began public assistance programs,

assist in the care of injured workers, and after being expelled from the towns,
widows, orphans, and cripples could barely subsist).
72. See id. at 142 (noting the gradual increase in wages from the beginning of
operations).
73. Id.
74. RONALD L. LEWIS, BLACK COAL MINERS IN AMERICA 123 (Univ. Press of Ky.,
1987).
75. See id. (noting that a large percentage of the new residents were African
Americans, lured from the Alabama farms by the promise of higher wages in the coal
mines).
76. Id. at 122.
77. ELLER, supra note 8, at xix.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing U.S. Dept of the Interior, Census Office, The Tenth Census: 1880,
Agricultural Statistics, III); U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930: Agriculture; the Southern States, II Pt.
2.).
80. After the death of the chestnut trees, the Appalachian residents were unable
to continue inexpensive hog farms, and many turned to the mines as their only
alternative. See LEWIS, supra note 74, at 182.
81. Id. at 183.
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three-quarters of the inhabitants of the Cumberland region of
82
Kentucky were eligible. In most other coal field counties, at least
83
one–third of the population was eligible for relief. Since that time,
Appalachia has fallen victim to the cyclical economy of the price of
84
coal.
The severance of mineral rights from the surface land appeared as
85
easy money to the mountaineers in the early 1900s. As a result, the
mineral owners dominated the surface-owning mountaineers, whose
homes and farms were subject to damage and destruction by the
86
mineral owners, frequently without any resulting liability imposed.
The nominal amounts paid by the mineral owners for this power was
woefully inadequate compensation for the unforeseeable future harm
87
to the Appalachian peoples’ farms, homes, and livelihood.
D. Futility of lawsuits against coal operators
Courts in the coal mining regions of Appalachia have a long history
88
of favoring coal companies. Since the turn of the last century, the
courts have been adamant in their support of the mining industry, at
the expense of any individual rights. In 1882, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated, “it is the policy of the country to encourage the
89
development of its mineral resources.” The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court followed this reasoning in 1886, stating, “[t]o encourage the
development of the great natural resources of a country, trifling
inconveniences to particular persons must sometimes give way to the
90
necessities of a great community.” The judicial presumption that

82. Id. at 184.
83. WELLER, supra note 55, at 19.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Compare WELLER, supra note 55 (discussing the economic hardships of
mountaineers), with Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 387 S.E.2d 783 (Va. 1990)
(discussing the extensive surface rights that mineral owners had over the land).
88. The author does not suggest that coal companies are always victorious in
Appalachian courts. The handful of cases that were decided against coal operators
highlight the pervasiveness of decisions enforcing the rights of the mineral owners at
the expense of the surface owners. See generally Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal,
105 S.E. 117, 122 (Va. 1920) (holding that a coal company cannot use the surface to
haul coal from another tract of land that it leases); Goodykoontz v. White Star
Mining Co., 119 S.E. 862, 864 (W. Va. 1927) (enjoining a mining company from
further removing and pulling support pillars from a lower seam that would result in
subsidence of an upper seam); Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 24 S.E.2d 559,
563 (Va. 1943) (granting an injunction to restrain a coal operator from building
miners’ houses, hotels, hospitals, and gardens for employees); Cogar v. Sommerville,
379 S.E.2d 764, 769 (W. Va. 1989) (enforcing a statute prohibiting strip mining near
homes).
89. Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co., 106 U.S. 447, 449 (1882).
90. Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 459 (Pa. 1886).
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the rights to mine coal are superior to all other rights has contributed
to the devastation of the surface lands in Appalachia.
Cases brought against coal companies are often dismissed or
decided by summary judgment, denying the plaintiff the benefits of a
91
trial. Suits against coal companies may also be subject to outrageous
delays, with no relief granted for decades, until the plaintiffs exhaust
their funds, energy, and hope. For example, a group of homeowners
filed a complaint in February 1968, against a coal operator in
92
Buchanan County, Virginia. The homeowners sought damages and
93
injunctive relief because of air pollution caused by coal dust. After a
grant of summary judgment for the coal company, remands resulted
in questions of jurisdiction and other procedural issues, keeping the
case in the courts for seven years, with no relief granted to the
94
homeowners.
One of the longest cases in Virginia history is Heirs of Roberts v. Coal
95
Processing Corp., in which the plaintiffs sought to collect rent of ten
96
cents per ton on a 99 year lease of coal rights. No rental payments
were ever made to the surface owners, despite the removal of millions
97
of tons of coal over three decades. The surface owners filed the case
in 1955, and as of June 10, 1988, the case was still in the courts, held
98
up by procedural issues. As these cases illustrate, the courts are
reluctant to impose liability on coal companies.
II. EXTENT OF MINING RIGHTS
After selling their mineral rights for pennies, the surface owners, or
their descendants, later learned that the sale included extensive
rights to the surface land. The sale of mineral rights also granted the
coal operators the right to pollute their streams and air; destroy their
spring, which may have been the only source of drinking water; and
destroy the surface land through subsidence cracks, fissures, swales
99
and floods. Coal operators also claimed the right to add haulage

91. See, e.g., Schultz v. Consolidation Coal Co., 475 S.E.2d 467 (W. Va. 1996)
(granting summary judgment for the coal company based on an insufficient
procedural history for the pertinent regulation).
92. Mullins v. Beatrice Pocahontas Co., 432 F.2d 314, 315 (4th Cir. 1970).
93. Id.
94. See Mullins v. Beatrice Pocahontas Co., 489 F.2d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1974)
(remanding the proceedings based on jurisdictional issues related to the coal
company).
95. 369 S.E.2d 188 (1988).
96. Id. at 188-89.
97. Id. at 190.
98. See id. at 191 (noting that the court remanded the case for further
proceedings stemming from the coal company’s statue of limitations plea).
99. See Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 387 S.E.2d 783, 786 (Va. 1990) (upholding
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roads wherever convenient to the coal operations, drill gas wells with
miles of pipes to drain away the methane gas, and add tipples,
buildings, and other structures as necessary or convenient to their
business, all of which had a significant impact on the surface owners’
100
ability to farm or use their land. Deeds were traditionally construed
against the grantor, even though it was the grantee coal operator who
101
generally drafted the mineral rights deeds.
Surface owners were
required to prove that the coal company’s actions were arbitrary,
wanton, or malicious, and not merely negligent, to be entitled to any
102
damages for the destruction of their surface land.
Coal operators were consistently granted rights superior to the
surface owner, even allowing the coal operator to destroy the house
and garden of the surface owner, so long as the coal operator paid
103
compensation for the improvements destroyed.
In the 1916
104
leading Virginia case of Stonegap Colliery v. Hamilton, a surface owner
sought damages for subsidence, when cracks, fissures and holes
appeared in the surface, making the land unsafe and unsuitable for
agriculture. All of the springs and streams were diverted and
destroyed. The severance deed at issue reserved the coal and “all the
105
usual mining privileges.” The court acknowledged the long line of
cases holding that surface owners have a right to subjacent support
106
unless expressly waived.
However, this right is limited by the
mineral owner’s right to interfere with “those subterranean streams
and percolations of water which appear upon the surface as springs,
and that to hold the owner of the [minerals] accountable for
damages for their disturbance would be in effect to say that he could

a coal company’s right to perform “longwall” coal mining, even though it was
decided that this particular type of mining would cause subsidence damage to the
surface land); see also Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 89 S.E. 605 (Va. 1916)
(determining that a coal company is not liable for the drying up of a surface spring
caused by its mining, if it is done in a usual and ordinary way).
100. See Lauff v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 15 Pa. D. & C. 532 (Pa. 1930) (holding that
coal operators have a right to conduct such activities without liability for injury to the
property unless there is proof of negligence).
101. See Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1993) (interpreting
conveyance of minerals by broad form deeds to allow extraction of those minerals by
any methods known at the time of conveyance).
102. Tolliver v. Pittsburgh-Consolidation Coal Co., 290 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Ky. App.
1956).
103. See McIntire v. Marian Coal Co., 227 S.W. 298, 300 (Ky. 1921) (“The mineral
estate under the deed is dominant, superior, and exclusive in every circumstance or
condition where the owner there of shall deem it necessary or convenient to make
such use of the surface as the deed allows.”).
104. 89 S.E. 305 (Va. 1916).
105. Id. at 308.
106. Id. at 311.
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107

have no use of his minerals.” The court denied any recovery to the
108
This decision paved the way for future courts to
surface owner.
validate waivers of liability or to deny responsibility for the loss of
subterranean streams or springs.
Applying reasoning similar to that used by the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in Stonegap Colliery, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
109
West Virginia in Squires v. Lafferty held that incident to ownership of
mineral rights is the right to use “all the means [necessary] to obtain
110
it.”
The court enjoined the surface owners from preventing the
coal owner from using a four-acre tract of land as a public highway to
111
transport machinery and equipment.
Following the trend of Stonegap Colliery, the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals later strengthened the rights of mine operators by finding
112
a corporation not liable for polluting a spring. In Oakwood Smokeless
113
Coal Corp. v. Meadows,
surface owners sued a coal company
operating on adjoining land for contaminating a spring that supplied
drinking water. Percolating water dripping from the roof of the mine
ran down the mountain and seeped into the spring in sufficient
114
The court found that “the
quantities to make it undrinkable.
[mine] owner cannot be held liable for permitting the natural flow of
mine water over his own land, into the watercourse . . . the discharge
of this acidulated water is practically a condition upon which the
115
ordinary use and enjoyment of coal lands depends.”
The court
further stated that, “[t]he right to mine coal without the right to
116
drain the mine is no right at all.”
Though the lessor did not list
drainage as a granted right in the deed, the court found that the
right to drainage “is fundamentally inherent where a mine owner is
given the right to ‘all other usual mining privileges necessary for the

107. Id. at 312.
108. Id.
109. 121 S.E. 90 (W. Va. 1924).
110. Id. at 90.
111. Id.
112. See Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp. v. Meadows, 34 S.E.2d 392, 395 (Va.
1945) (explaining that the court should gauge the incidental rights of a miner on a
case by case basis and such rights would thus be dependent on changing conditions
and circumstances).
113. Id. at 393.
114. Id. at 393-94 (explaining that the water flowed from a ventilation shaft
installed by the mining company pursuant to statutory requirements).
115. Id. at 395 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 457 (Pa. 1886)).
116. Id. at 396 (indicating that the original deed gave the predecessors all rights
and privileges necessary for the full enjoyment of their mining right). The initial
contract granted the mining interest full right to undermine subjacent support, the
right to ingress and regress, along with all other privileges necessary for the full use
of the mineral grant. See id. at 392.
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full enjoyment of the premises hereby granted . . . .’”
A particularly onerous 1907 deed granted a coal company broad
mineral and any surface rights deemed necessary or convenient by
118
the coal company.
The grantor reserved use of the surface for
agricultural purposes “so far as such use is consistent with the rights”
119
conveyed to the coal company.
The court held that the coal
company acted within its rights by occupying and improving the 142
acres because the grants given to the coal company in the original
120
deed were so sweeping. The court also held that the coal company
could occupy the land enclosed or occupied by the surface owner as
long as they did not “destroy or render useless . . . [the surface
owner’s] residence, barn, garden, orchard, well, and such structures
121
as are of a permanent and substantial nature.”
Later courts granted even broader rights to coal operators,
including allowing destruction of the surface owner’s residence. In
122
Russell Fork Coal Co. v. Hawkins, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
found a strip miner not liable for the loss of the plaintiff’s home that
123
resulted from a flooding incident.
In this case the strip-mining
operation created a large excavation, nearly seven feet deep and
covering nearly four acres, which filled with water, resulting in a
124
substantial lake.
After an intense storm caused flash flooding,
home owners argued that the coal company’s negligence contributed
125
to the damage. Harry Caudill described the situation in his book:
The Russell Fork Coal Company had cut off the top of a mountain on
Weddington Fork of Ferrells Creek, leaving ten acres of loose earth, mixed
to a great depth with stones and fragments of trees. This vast mass of
unstable rubble lay on the upper reaches of a narrow valley, on the floor of
which several families made their homes. It was created in an area which
had been battered by flash floods throughout its history, so that even the
feeblest of minds could have anticipated their recurrence at almost any
time. On the night of August 2, 1945, the calamity came in the form of a
cloudburst, and foreseeably, thousands of tons of dirt, rocks, and shattered
tree trunks from the devastated mountain were flung down the hillside


117. Id. at 397.
118. McIntyre v. Marian Coal Co., 227 S.W. 298, 298-99 (Ky. App. 1921).
119. Id. at 299.
120. Id. at 299-300. The court stated earlier in the opinion that it would construe
any ambiguity in the deed in favor of the grantee. Id. at 299. The court further
explained that “[t]he terms of the deed could hardly be broader or more sweeping
in favor of the grantee.” Id.
121. Id. at 300.
122. 223 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1949).
123. Id. at 892.
124. Id. at 888.
125. Id. at 888-89.
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into the raging creek. Like a titanic scythe the rolling rubble swept
downstream, working havoc among the houses, stores, and farms. When
the dazed inhabitants recovered sufficiently they sued the coal company
126
for damages . . . .

The court found that the plaintiffs’ loss was “brought about by the
forces of nature over which man has no control and that it is not
shown by the evidence that their loss was caused by the negligence of
127
[the strip miner].”
Additionally, courts are reluctant to grant damages against coal
companies that are the result of blasting, typically the subject of strict
liability in other settings. In 1982, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
reversed an award of $50,000 for the complete destruction of the
128
plaintiff’s home as a result of a strip miner’s blasting activity. The
court held that the coal company was liable for damages to the
natural state of the surface but limited damages to the reasonable
129
cost of repair.
The Fourth Circuit, applying the laws of the Appalachian states,
also uses a variety of methods to deny recovery against coal
companies, even in cases where the plaintiffs have suffered the loss of
130
131
their homes. In Ward v. Island Creek Coal Co., the plaintiffs argued
that sink holes and severe damage to their well and septic system
resulted from the coal company’s failure to maintain subjacent
132
support for their property. Major structural damage to their house,
outbuildings, sidewalks and the surface of their land appeared in
133
1987.
The defendant conducted longwall mining under the
134
plaintiffs’ property until 1986.
The court upheld a summary
judgment verdict favoring the coal company because the first
significant damage to the property occurred more than five years
135
before the filing of the suit. Controlling the decision is the Virginia
statute of limitations, which provided that every action for injury to

126. CAUDILL, supra note 13, at 308.
127. Russell Fork Coal Co., 223 S.W.2d at 892.
128. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Rodgers, 644 S.W.2d 339, 350 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
129. Id. at 344 (holding as a matter of first impression, that “natural state” is the
condition of the surface, including reasonable and foreseeable improvements at the
last time the coal company took minerals from the earth).
130. See Ward v. Island Creek Coal Co., No. 93-1823, 1995 WL 371676, at *1 (4th
Cir. June 22, 1995) (affirming summary judgment in favor of coal company
defendants; noting that homeowner’s claim is barred by Virginia’s five-year statute of
limitations pertaining to property damage; and requiring evidence of surface
damage, not just subterranean erosion).
131. Id.
132. Id. at *1.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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136

property must be brought within five years from the point of injury.
In 1989 a federal district court in West Virginia did not find a coal
operator liable, even though the plaintiff’s home had been destroyed
137
by the methane gas released from the mine. In Ball v. Island Creek
138
Coal Co., the operator used the longwall mining method, which
consequently caused methane gas to be released, causing three gas
139
fires on the surface. The surface owner also alleged that his home
and dairy building were destroyed by fire when he turned on a light
140
in his basement, igniting the methane gas. Nevertheless, the court
granted summary judgment for the coal operator, determining that
contemplation of a particular underground mining technique at the
time the parties executed the deed was not relevant to the
141
permissibility of that technique. Therefore, the waiver of subjacent
support was valid even though the parties had not contemplated
142
longwall mining in the original deed.
The above is merely a partial list to illustrate the extent of damages
suffered by surface owners, and the reluctance of the courts to
impose liability on coal companies. The frequent damage to real
estate, including destruction of dwellings, has contributed to the low
standard of living in Appalachia.
III. RIGHT TO STRIP MINE
One of the most damaging ways to exploit mineral rights is
143
through strip mining.
Courts and legislatures have struggled for
decades with the competing concerns that arise when the surface soil
and vegetation are stripped away to allow access to the coal. Unlike
the Ball case, where a federal court stated that the type of mining in
144
use at the time of severance was irrelevant, a 1976 Virginia court, in
145
Phipps v. Leftwich, determined the intent of the parties when the
severance deed was executed by deducing whether coal companies

136. Id. at *1-2 (holding that the five year statute of limitations accrued from 1983;
the plaintiffs filed the action in 1991); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(B) (1999).
137. Ball v. Island Creek Coal Co., 722 F. Supp. 1370 (W.D. Va. 1989).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1371.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1373-74 (noting that parties to a deed should expect improvement
in mining techniques over time).
142. Id. at 1371-74 (relying on Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271
(1916)).
143. See Phipps v. Leftwich, 222 S.E.2d 536, 537 n.1 (Va. 1976) (explaining that
strip mining entails removing the strata above the coal and then extracting the coal
that is uncovered).
144. Ball, 722 F. Supp. at 1370.
145. 222 S.E.2d 536 (Va. 1976).
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146

used strip mining at the time of such deed. Phipps involved a 1902
deed that conveyed mineral rights in typical broad form deed
147
language.
The language included the following: “in all or any
manner that may be deemed necessary or convenient for mining . . .
or otherwise utilizing all or any of the said coal . . . without liability
148
for injury to the surface of said land . . . .” In light of the deed’s
language, the successor in interest to the surface owners sought a
149
In support of their
declaratory judgment to prevent strip mining.
interpretation of the deed, the owners presented testimony that
150
underground mining was the only method used in 1902.
Because
the parties to the 1902 deed contemplated only underground
mining, the court affirmed an injunction prohibiting strip or surface
151
mining without the consent of the surface owners.
In light of the courts’ difficulties in adjudicating conflicts between
strip miners and landowners, the Kentucky and Tennessee
legislatures took the power to determine strip mining rights away
152
from the courts.
The damage from strip mining in Kentucky,
where entire mountains have disappeared, is generally considered to
153
be the worst in the nation.
Historically, strip miners have not
154
restored the land after completing strip mining operations.
In
155
Green v. Asher Coal Mining Co., the court noted that during heavy
rains, vast quantities of loose rock, dirt, and coal are washed down the
mountains, often destroying homes, flooding rivers, and dumping
156
debris in backyards.
In a 1956 decision, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals found that a broad form deed granted the right to strip
mine, a decision which remained in effect for three devastating
157
decades.
However, in November 1988, paralleling the Virginia Phipps
decision, the Kentucky legislature passed the “Broad Form Deed
158
Amendment,” which amended the Kentucky Constitution Section

146. Id. at 537-38.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 538.
150. Id. at 540.
151. Id. at 542.
152. See, e.g., 1988 KY. ACTS. CH. 117 § 1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-8-308(k) (Supp.
1980) (repealed 1984).
153. CAUDILL, supra note 13.
154. Id.
155. 377 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. App. 1964).
156. Id. at 69.
157. Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40, 42-43 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956) (holding that
the deed’s silence on strip mining did not preclude the defendant from strip mining
the land).
158. 1988 KY. ACTS Ch. 117 § 1.
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19(2), providing:
In any instrument . . . purporting to sever the surface and mineral
estates . . . which fails to describe the method of coal extraction to
be employed . . . in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary . . . the intention of the parties . . . was that the coal
be extracted only by the method . . . commonly in use in Kentucky
159
in the area affected at the time the instrument was executed . . .
160

A 1980 Tennessee statute contained similar provisions.
Prior to the Broad Form Deed Amendment to the Kentucky
Constitution, which limited the right to strip mine, many cases were
brought to determine whether owners of mineral rights had the right
161
162
to strip mine. The Buchanan v. Watson case allowed strip mining
based on a 1903 deed whereby the owner deeded the mineral rights
163
The court found this
and released the grantee from any liability.
broad grant to allow strip mining, or any other method of removing
the coal, even though coal companies did not practice strip mining in
164
the area in 1903. The opinion stated that:
[T]he owner of the mineral has the paramount right to the use of
the surface in the prosecution of its business for any purpose of
necessity or convenience, unless this power is exercised
oppressively, arbitrarily, wantonly, or maliciously, in which event
165
the surface owner may recover for damages so occasioned.

In 1974, a creative plaintiff attempted to convince the Sixth Circuit
that destruction of property by strip mining was actionable under the
166
Civil Rights Act in Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co. The court found that
the interpretation of the broad form deeds by the Kentucky courts
did not amount to an unconstitutional taking of the surface owner’s
167
rights. Furthermore, the issuance of a permit to strip mine was not
168
sufficient state action to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

159. KY. CONST. § 19(2).
160. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-8-308(k) (Supp. 1980) (repealed 1984); see also
Doochin v. Rackley, 610 S.W.2d 715, 719-20 (Tenn. 1981) (upholding the
constitutionality of the statute).
161. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956).
162. Id. at 41-42.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 42-43 (highlighting the fact that strip mining was the only feasible way
for the miners to extract the coal).
165. Id. at 43 (citations omitted).
166. 498 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1974) (arguing that the owners of the mineral rights,
by strip mining the land, denied the plaintiffs their due process rights and unlawfully
took their land without just compensation).
167. Id. at 1189-91.
168. Id. at 1192-93 (maintaining that the right to strip mine and the waiver of
damages originates in the broad form deed, not the state licensing authority).
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The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Watson case, over
169
Justice Douglas first
the impassioned dissent of Justice Douglas.
noted that the Kentucky statute that prohibited strip mining without
the consent of the surface owner, would moot the claim for injunctive
170
relief, but not the claim for damages for past actions.
In lengthy
quotes from Harry Caudill’s book, Night Comes to the Cumberlands,
Justice Douglas mentioned the difficulty of proving damages, but
stated that “such obstacles cannot justify throwing [the petitioners]
171
out of court at the pleading stage.” Justice Douglas urged that the
state action of granting strip mining permits, combined with the
court cases enforcing the rights of the coal companies, constituted
172
sufficient state action for a civil rights claim.
If a petitioner came to us claiming that he had entered into a
written contract for the sale of his car, and that the state courts, in
an action upon the contract, had interpreted the term ‘car’ to
include not only his automobile but his house, dog, and vegetable
garden as well, I would hesitate to characterize as wholly frivolous
his claim that he had been deprived of property without due
173
process of law.

The last in a line of Kentucky cases allowing strip mining based on
174
general grants in broad form deeds was Akers v. Baldwin.
Chief
Justice Stephens wrote the majority opinion of the court, while two
justices submitted separate, concurring opinions and two other
justices wrote a dissent. In this case, strip mining did not exist at the
175
time of the severance.
Thus the surface owners had requested an
176
The court found
injunction to prevent strip mining.
unconstitutional a Kentucky statute that required courts to find that
parties intended coal to be mined by methods in use at the time the
177
deed was executed. Interestingly, this statute strongly resembled the
1988 Kentucky Broad Form Deed Amendment, which was passed in
an attempt to circumvent the court’s finding of unconstitutionality by

169. Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., 422 U.S. 1012, 1012-19 (1975) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
170. Id. at 1012 n.1 (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350.060 (1975)).
171. Id. at 1019.
172. Id. at 1017 (citing Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (1956) and Martin v.
Ky. Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (1968)).
173. Id. at 1019.
174. 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987), overruled by 1998 KY. ACTS ch. 117 § 1.
175. Id. at 297.
176. Id. at 296.
177. Id. at 309-10 (determining that the legislature improperly passed Sections
381.930-945 of the Kentucky statutes because it was the judiciary’s responsibility “to
determine the issues presented in the interpretation of past transactions,” not the
legislature’s responsibility).
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178

The Broad Form Deed Amendment
amending the constitution.
eventually overruled Akers. The court in Akers found that the mineral
owner could strip mine, using the entire surface, but had to pay
damages to the owner of the surface for harm to the surface, unless
the deed expressly stated the permitted method of mining and
179
contained an express waiver of damages.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed a grant of
summary judgment in favor of a coal company in Russell v. Island
180
Creek Coal Co., finding that a grantee’s waiver of the right to recover
181
damages negated the strip miner’s obligation to restore the land.
182
The plaintiffs granted the coal company the right to strip mine.
The strip mining operations contaminated a spring used by the
183
plaintiffs for drinking water. The plaintiffs brought suit relying on
the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act
184
(WVSCMRA”), alleging that the statute required that the land be
restored to its “approximate original contour” and pre-mining use as
185
farm land. The court found that the plaintiffs waived their rights to
186
the spring in the deed granting the right to surface mine.
The
court allowed the coal operator to violate the mandates of a statute

178. 1988 KY. ACTS ch. 117 § 1.
179. Akers v. Baldwin 736 S.W.2d 294, 305 (Ky. 1987), overruled by, KY. ACTS ch. 117
§ 1.
180. 389 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1989) (holding that the West Virginia Surface Coal
Mining and Reclamation Act is not inconsistent with the Federal Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act, and that the property owners waived their private
rights to their water in the conveyance to the mining company).
181. See id. at 204 (concluding that, if a property owner knowingly waived the
requirement of the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act that
water be replaced, they may not then bring a private cause of action for money
damages or injunction).
182. Id. at 196.
183. Id. at 197.
184. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-1 to 22-3-30 (Michie 1998).
185. See Russell, 389 S.E.2d at 197. Plaintiffs argued for monetary damages in the
form of $20,000 for failure to replace their water source at the conclusion of its
operations as required by their interpretation of the West Virginia Surface Coal
Mining and Reclamation Act and Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act. Id. Plaintiffs also argued for equitable relief to require the coal company to
replace their water and to restore the property to its pre-mining use as farm land. Id.
at 197 n.7.
186. Id. at 204. The court quoted the language of the deed as follows:
[T]he right to strip the said surface, sub-surface and other strata overlying all
of said coal; . . . the right to deposit anywhere upon the said surface, subsurface and/or the space remaining after the removal of any of said coal,
such earth, rock, stone, slate and other material as may be produced in
connection with the operations hereunder . . . all without liability by the
grantee, its successors or assigns, for damages arising out of the exercise of
such rights to the surface or sub-surface or anything therein or thereon or to
the springs and water courses therein or thereon.
Id. at 196.
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merely because the deed from a private individual contained a waiver
187
of rights. The statute contemplates waivers, and the court indicated
its intent to broadly interpret such waivers, even if the effect is to
188
undermine the purposes of the statute.
Even more damaging than strip mining, mountain-top removal
coal mining became common in the 1990s in West Virginia and
189
Kentucky. Environmentalists have noted the drastic “change in the
topography, which leaves the land more subject to floods, results in
the pollution of streams and rivers, and has an ‘incalculable’ impact
190
on wildlife.” The top of the mountain is actually removed, and all
rock and soil is placed in a nearby hollow or valley; the coal is then
removed, and the mountain top is theoretically replaced to its
191
original contour. Environmental groups have alleged that the West
Virginia Department of Environmental Protection has abused its
discretion in issuing permits allowing mountain-top removal, and
192
failed to ensure reclamation.
Courts have not favored these
environmentalists’ suits, rejecting challenges to the state laws or their
193
enforcement.

187. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-24(b) (emphasis added):
Any operator shall replace the water supply of an owner of interest in real
property who obtains all or part of the owner’s supply of water for domestic,
agricultural, industrial or other legitimate use from an underground or
surface source where the supply has been affected by contamination,
diminution or interruption proximately caused by the surface-mining
operation, unless waived by the owner.
188. See id. § 22-3-2(b)(1) (recognizing that the first purpose of the West Virginia
Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act is “[t]o protect the public and the
environment from the adverse effect of surface-mining operations.”).
189. See Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that
mountaintop-removal coal mining became widespread in the 1990s), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 920 (2002).
190. Id. (quoting Penny Loeb, Special Report: Shear Madness, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 11, 1997).
191. See id. (defining mountaintop-removal mining); see also 30 C.F.R. § 785.14
(2001):
Mountaintop removal mining means surface mining activities, where the
mining operation removes an entire coal seam or seams running through
the upper fraction of a mountain, ridge, or hill, except as provided for in 30
CFR 824.11(a)(6), by removing substantially all of the overburden off the
bench and creating a level plateau or a gently rolling contour, with no
highways remaining, and capable of supporting post-mining land uses in
accordance with the requirements of this section.
192. See, e.g., Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286; see also W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v.
Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 475-76 (S.D.W. Va. 2001) (dismissing conservancy
group plaintiff’s federal complaint against the Director of the West Virginia Division
of Environmental Protection, which requested the court to enjoin the Director from
issuing any future surface mining permits).
193. See, e.g., Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286 (rejecting plaintiffs’ claims); Norton, 147 F.
Supp. 2d at 475-76 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims).
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Although strip mining has been limited by recent court decisions
and legislative action, the devastation caused by strip mining is still in
evidence everywhere in Appalachia. The stripped vegetation results
in floods and mudslides that damage homes and crops. Reclamation
194
legislation exists but is rarely enforced. In addition to the Federal
195
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, many states
have adopted surface mining reclamation acts, including West
196
The enforcement of waivers of
Virginia, Virginia, and Kentucky.
water rights or surface damages by the surface owners limits the
197
effectiveness of these statutes.
Although strip mining recovery
regulations have somewhat limited the harm caused by new strip
mines, in many areas the destruction was already substantial before
the adoption of these regulations.
IV. SUBSISDENCE
Subsidence occurs when a portion of land sinks, shifts, cracks, or
198
changes shape because of the removal of underground coal. Many
surface owners have suffered damages to their homes and crops by
subsidence, but courts are reluctant to impose liability on the coal
199
companies for this type of harm. Mining methods used in the early
1900s, where pillars were used to hold up rooms of coal, resulted in
sinkholes and slow subsidence occurring over decades as the pillars
slowly eroded. Longwall mining, which has been in common use for
only the past few decades, has resulted in immediate and more

194. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994) (authorizing reclamation for
regulation of surface coal mining operations, protection of environmental rights of
surface and land owners, and others with legal interest in land).
195. Id.
196. See West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 22-3-1 to 22-3-30 (Michie 1998); Virginia Coal Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1979, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 45.1-226 to 45.1-270.7 (Michie 2000);
Mineral Deeds, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.930-381.945 (Banks-Baldwin 2000). Many
of these statutes acknowledge waivers or other limitations of coal operators’
obligations.
197. See, e.g., Russell v. Island Creek Coal Co., 389 S.E.2d 194, 204 (W. Va. 1989)
(finding that plaintiffs had no cause of action because they knowingly waived the
requirement of the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act that
water be replaced by the coal company).
198. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 453, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (defining
and providing background to subsidence control regulation); see also Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (defining subsidence as occurring
when “a patch of land over an underground mine sinks, shifts, or otherwise changes
its configuration.”).
199. See, e.g., Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 387 S.E.2d 783, 786 (Va. 1990)
(reversing a trial court’s ruling and refusing to enjoin a defendant coal company
from continuing its mining operations despite undisputed evidence of subsidence
caused by the coal operator’s mining).
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200

drastic subsidence. “Longwall mining is a mining technique by
which coal is removed without leaving pillars to support the mine
roof. The mine roof is held up by self advancing hydraulic supports
that progress forward with the cutting equipment, allowing the roof
201
to collapse behind the supports.” “The difficulty with longwall
mining is that, as practiced in the United States today, it causes
subsidence of the surface overlying and in the vicinity of the [channel
of coal being mined] and often results in loss or damage to natural
202
water sources.”
When land subsides from longwall mining, or other methods of
mining, the surface can sink as much as six feet, depending on the
depth of the coal seam removed. Surface cracks or fissures may
appear, depending on the topography, the flexibility of the surface,
and the type of overlying rock. The sunken area from longwall
mining can be as large as 3,000 to 5,000 feet long and up to 700 feet
203
wide. Different composition of the surface and rock layers over the
removed coal can result in uneven sinking, which can cause the real
estate to have irregular bumps, ridges, and cracks, destroying the
204
value of the surface for construction, agriculture, or other uses.
Areas surrounding the mined area are also affected, by a
phenomenon known as the “angle of draw,” where the impact on the
205
surface covers a wider area than the area mined.
Landslides,

200. See id. at 784 (conceding that longwall coal mining involves the removal of all
the coal in a seam without leaving any pillars of coal behind, which results in the
subsidence of the land surface). Justice Russell, in dissent, recognized that not only
was there undisputed evidence that the coal operator’s longwall mining was causing
subsidence, but the coal company had no intention of restoring the land to its
former condition after extracting all of the coal and departing. Id. at 787.
201. See J. Thomas Lane, Fire in the Hole to Longwall Shears: Old Law Applied to New
Technology and Other Longwall Mining Issues, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 577, 584 (1994)
(quoting Porter v. Consolidation Coal Co., No. 86-1396 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1988),
aff’d, 870 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1989)). Both the district court memorandum and order,
as well as the circuit court’s decision affirming the district court in Porter, are
unpublished opinions. However, both opinions can be found as Exhibits A and C
respectively in Culp v. Consol Pennsylvania Co., No. CIV.A.87-1688, 1989 WL 101553, at
*14-22 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 1989).
202. See Joshua I. Barrett, Longwall Mining and SMCRA: Unstable Ground for
Regulators and Litigants, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 693, 695 (1992) (examining the general
and specific provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
and the state programs approved to implement it as they relate to modern longwall
mining).
203. See, e.g., Large, 387 S.E.2d at 785 (discussing the effects of longwall mining).
204. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474-75
(1987) (describing the detrimental effect of coal mine subsidence, including damage
to structures, to the land itself so that development is difficult or impossible, and to
farming since the land cannot be plowed or prepared properly).
205. See Barrett, supra note 202, at 695-96 (discussing the types and extent of
subsidence damage).
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slipping, and destruction of springs and streams are also common.
In addition to damage to the surface, removing coal can damage
seams of coal located above the seam being mined. Rights of owners
of upper seams of coal are afforded greater protection for subsidence
than surface owners. The rights of subjacent support of owners of
other coal seams depends on two factors: if the upper or
superincumbent seam was the first to be severed, and the severing fee
owner did not waive the right to subjacent support of all overlying
207
strata, then the upper seam has the right to support.
In 1983, federal regulations were promulgated requiring
underground coal operators to correct material damage to structures
resulting from subsidence by repairing or compensating the owners,
208
but only to the extent required under state law.
Thus, it is
necessary to review the case law of each state to determine liability for
subsidence.
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
209
(“SMCRA”), requires strip miners to restore the surface to its
210
original contour.
The West Virginia Supreme Court held that
SMCRA applies also to underground operations, holding that the
operator of an underground mine is required to “correct any
material damage resulting from subsidence caused to surface lands,
to the extent technologically and economically feasible by restoring
the land to a condition capable of maintaining the value and
reasonably foreseeable uses which it was capable of supporting before
211
subsidence.” Notwithstanding this requirement, waivers of support
212
are not invalidated by SMCRA.

206. Id.
207. See Robert Louis Shuman, Subjacent Support: A Right Afforded to Surface Estates
Alone?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 1111, 1119-20 (1995) (summarizing rulings of two West
Virginia cases, which reveal dependency of support rights of overlying coal strata on
these two factors).
208. See 30 C.F.R. § 817.121(c)(2) (2001) (“The permittee must correct any
material damage resulting from subsidence caused to surface lands, to the extent
technologically and economically feasible, by restoring the land to a condition
capable of maintaining the value and reasonably foreseeable uses that it was capable
of supporting before subsidence damage.”); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Lujan, 928
F.2d 453, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (defining land subsidence and providing a brief
regulatory history).
209. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
210. See id. § 1266(b)(1) (requiring coal operators to “adopt measures consistent
with known technology in order to prevent subsidence causing material damage to
the extent technologically and economically feasible, maximize mine stability, and
maintain the value and reasonably foreseeable use of such surface lands.”).
211. Rose v. Oneida Coal Co., 466 S.E.2d 794, 801 (W. Va. 1995).
212. See Schultz v. Consolidation Coal Co., 475 S.E.2d 467, 469 (W. Va. 1996)
(affirming a lower court’s finding that nothing in the SMCRA has invalidated the
state’s common law allowing property owners to waive subjacent support).
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A waiver of subjacent support for subsidence resulting from pillar
removal was common at the time the severance deeds were executed,
and such a waiver also is valid for subsidence resulting from longwall
213
If a severance deed contains an express waiver of surface
mining.
support, a majority of courts have held that the mineral rights owner
is permitted to use longwall mining, notwithstanding the fact that the
parties to the original severance deed did not contemplate the
214
longwall mining method. Although many states, in theory, require
compensation to surface owners for damage to the surface, many
courts have refused to consider surface subsidence or other injury
215
caused by longwall mining worthy of compensation.
This refusal
perpetuates the favorable treatment of coal interests by Appalachian
courts.
A. Kentucky
The Kentucky legislature passed Section 19(2) of the Kentucky
Constitution, commonly known as the Broad Form Deed
216
Amendment, in 1988.
This amendment prohibited the mineral
owner under a broad form deed from strip mining, unless this
method was in use at the time of the deed’s execution or expressly
217
authorized in the deed. This amendment generally is perceived as

213. See Timothy W. Gresham & Monroe Jamison, Do Waivers of Support and Damage
Authorize Full Extraction Mining?, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 911, 935-36 (1990) (explaining a
district court decision permitting use of longwall technology under severance deeds
waiving subjacent support and liability for damages in Virginia, and noting that
courts generally uphold waivers against claims for subsidence-related damages,
subject to some limitations on enforceability of such waivers); Lane, supra note 201,
at 602 (noting importance of court recognition of a type of subsidence that results
from longwall mining).
214. See Judy Jones Lewis, Comment, Severance Deed Waivers of the Surface Estate’s
Right to Subjacent Support as a Basis for Longwall Mining Rights, 6 J. MIN. L. & POL’Y 309
(1991) (noting that a series of cases from Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia effectively
have established a rule that a mineral estate owner has the right to use the longwall
mining method if a severance deed contains an express waiver of subjacent support).
Cf. Robert E. Beck, Protecting the Public Interest or Surface Owners from their Own Folly?: A
Close Look at “Preventing” Subsidence Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977 (SMCRA), 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 391 (1997).
215. See Lewis, supra note 214 (noting that, even in states that prohibit surface
mining without additional compensation to surface owners when such mining
techniques were not originally contemplated by the parties, courts in these states
consistently have refused to apply similar reasoning to longwall mining).
216. See KY. CONST. § 19(2) (delineating, in part, rules of construction for mineral
deeds relating to coal extraction); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350.060 (BanksBaldwin 1988) (prohibiting strip mining without an appropriate permit).
217. See KY. CONST. § 19(2) (stating, in relevant part, that severance instruments
that do not expressly state the method of coal extraction to be employed shall be
interpreted to mean that the parties agreed to the method commonly used in the
respective area of Kentucky at the time of the deed’s execution).
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218

It also views the inherent subsidence
permitting longwall mining.
as merely an improvement of the room and pillar method and not as
219
a new method of mining.
Kentucky courts have long held that mineral owners’ rights are
220
subservient to surface owners’ rights to be free from subsidence.
However, this acknowledgement has not led to recovery of damages
by surface owners. Damages for subsidence are measured by the
difference in the market value of the surface before and after the
221
subsidence occurred, as determined by appraisers.
The issue of value, however, rarely is considered because the courts
often dismiss cases based on a lack of causation or waiver of liability.
A 1997 case, for example, involved a longwall mining operation that
caused subsidence, destroying an upper strata of coal and mining
222
The
equipment belonging to the owner of the upper strata.
severance deed contained an express waiver of liability and, because
the deed was executed between sophisticated business persons, the
223
court refused to find any liability for subsidence.
A Kentucky court similarly denied recovery for subsidence in a
224
1940 decision. That court found that damage to a surface owner’s

218. See Karst-Robbins Coal Co. v. Arch of Ky., 964 S.W.2d 419, 424 (Ky. Ct. App.
1997) (noting that Section 19(2) of the Kentucky Constitution was intended “only to
prohibit strip mining operations conducted pursuant to broad form deeds in the
absence of the surface owner’s consent,” but not to additionally prohibit use of
modern techniques of underground mining such as longwall mining); see also
Eardley, supra note 27, at 107-09 (explaining that the Broad Form Deed Amendment
was not intended to preclude longwall mining).
219. See Karst-Robbins Coal Co., 964 S.W.2d at 424 (concluding that “the modern
longwall mining is not a separate method of ‘underground, surface, auger or open
pit mining’ . . . and that it therefore is not an excluded ‘method’ of mining for
purposes of Section 19(2)”) (internal citations omitted); see also Eardley, supra note
27, at 111 (noting that longwall mining is viewed as a modern underground mining
technique and, thus, does not constitute a separate mining method under the Broad
Form Deed Amendment).
220. See N. E. Coal Co. v. Hayes, 51 S.W.2d 960, 961-62 (Ky. Ct. App. 1932) (stating
that surface owners’ rights to have surface maintained in its natural state, free from
subsidence or parting of soil, are absolute).
221. See H.B. Jones Coal Co. v. Mays, 8 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Ky. Ct. App. 1928)
(holding that permanent injury, which results from subsidence of surface through
removal of subjacent support by a mineral owner, shall be compensated by
calculating the difference in the market value of the surface before and after the
infliction of injury).
222. See Karst-Robbins Coal Co., 964 S.W.2d at 422 (discussing a tort action, which
sought compensatory and punitive damages for mining damage and destruction of
certain mining equipment).
223. See id. (stating that the parties kept abreast of one another’s activities and that
the deed clause, expressly waiving the damages liability waiver clause, absent
arbitrary, wanton, malicious, or gross negligence, was enforceable).
224. See Bogar v. Fordson Coal Co., 142 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1940)
(refusing damages to surface owner where owner failed to adequately prove that
damages were caused by mining operations).
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property (including the sinking by several feet of a one-acre field,
cracking in the surface, and pollution of a well) was caused by
225
“weather conditions.” An earlier court similarly denied recovery for
a well’s destruction because the coal operations took place under
adjoining property, not directly under the land of the plaintiff
226
surface owner.
Thus, Kentucky surface owners are unlikely to
recover for subsidence because of the state courts’ tendency to
interpret waivers broadly and their reluctance to find causation.
B. Tennessee
In the few reported cases involving subsidence in Tennessee, the
state courts have been willing to impose liability for subsidence but
the damages granted to surface owners have been nominal. For
227
example, in the 1946 case of Campbell v. Campbell, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals upheld an award of $250 for damages to the surface
228
caused by subsidence.
The plaintiffs owned the surface of a oneacre lot and much of the coal had been removed twenty years
229
earlier. The defendants removed the supports by blasting, thereby
230
causing damage to a well and subsidence of the land.
C. Virginia
Unlike the Kentucky courts that often dismiss subsidence cases on
waiver and causation issues, Virginia courts are likely to grant
summary judgment to coal operators in subsidence cases, refusing to
find the effects worthy of compensation. In the leading 1916 Virginia
231
case of Stonegap Colliery v. Hamilton, a surface owner sought damages
232
for subsidence. Cracks, fissures and holes appeared in the surface,

225. See id. at 155 (noting that voluminous testimony suggested that surface
conditions complained of resulted from “slides” that had been common in the
vicinity for several years due to weather conditions).
226. See W. Ky. Coal Co. v. Dilback, 294 S.W. 478, 479 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927) (holding
that although surface owner retains an absolute right to ensure absence of damage to
his surface caused by subsidence or parting of the soil from mining directly under
the surface, such a right does not extend to damages caused by mining operations on
adjacent land and, thus, coal mine operator is not liable to adjacent land owner for
damages to a well resulting from the subsidence of lateral support, absent proof of
negligence).
227. 199 S.W.2d 931 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).
228. See id. at 935 (refusing to overrule a lower court’s construction of the deed or
to alter damages awarded).
229. See id. at 933-34 (noting that no evidence of surface damage existed after the
initial extraction twenty years earlier).
230. See id. at 934 (noting that supports had to be blasted out and that the
subsidence occurred shortly after the mining operations of defendants, thus
establishing proximate cause of the damage).
231. 89 S.E. 305 (Va. 1916).
232. See id. at 307 (involving an action of trespass to recover damages allegedly
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making the land unsafe and unsuitable for agriculture, and all the
springs and streams supplying the land were diverted and
233
destroyed. The court acknowledged the long line of cases holding
that surface owners have a right to subjacent support unless expressly
234
waived. This right, however, is limited by the mineral owner’s right
to interfere with “those subterranean streams and percolations of
235
water that appear upon the surface as springs.”
According to the
court, to hold the mineral owner responsible for damage caused by
such disturbances effectively would preclude the owner’s use of his or
236
her minerals.
237
In the 1989 case of Breeding v. Koch Carbon, Inc., a federal district
court came to a different conclusion when faced with the destruction
238
of a spring.
The court enforced the absolute right to subjacent
support because the severance deed lacked any waiver from the
239
surface owner.
The severance deed language mimicked the
240
language used in the Stonegap Colliery case, providing a grant of coal
241
and “all the usual and necessary mining privileges.”
The Breeding
court followed the rule that if a miner withdraws subjacent support
for the land of another and causes subsidence, even if the subsidence
would have occurred in the absence of artificial additions to the land,
the miner “is strictly liable not only for the harm to the land caused
by the subsidence, but also for any harm to the artificial additions on
242
the land that results from the subsidence.”
The court did not
require the surface owner to prove negligence by the coal operator
and placed the burden of evidence on the coal operator to
demonstrate that the subsidence would not have occurred in the

resulting from the mining and removal of the coal under the plaintiff’s lands by the
defendant, without leaving sufficient natural or artificial supports to prevent
subsidence).
233. Id.
234. See id. at 311 (citing cases from several states wherein such courts construed
deeds as upholding the right to subjacent support by a surface owners, absent an
express waiver thereof).
235. Id. at 312.
236. Id.
237. 726 F. Supp. 645 (W.D. Va. 1989).
238. See id. at 650 (concluding that the defendant is strictly liable because “[t]he
deed severing the surface estate of the plaintiffs from the mineral estate does not
contain a waiver of the surface owner’s common law right of subjacent support”).
239. See id. (explaining that a Virginia court will find a waiver only when the
language in a deed is “clear and unequivocal”).
240. Stonegap Colliery Co., 89 S.E. at 311; see also Breeding, 726 F. Supp. at 650
(characterizing the severance deed language as “correspond[ing] so closely to the
language of the deed in Stonegap”).
241. Breeding, 726 F. Supp. at 650.
242. Id. at 648.
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243

In denying summary
absence of improvements or buildings.
judgment, the court found no waiver of support to prevent liability
244
for loss of a spring.
Although the Breeding case upheld significant rights for surface
245
owners in Virginia, less than a year later these rights evaporated. In
246
the 1990 case of Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., the court determined
that subsidence from longwall mining did not cause appreciable
damage. Owners of eighty-one acres of unimproved surface land in
Dickenson County sought an injunction against a coal company that
247
owned the coal under the surface.
The coal company planned to
employ the “longwall” method of mining that would result in the
surface subsiding into five ditches, each three feet deep, 3,000 to
248
5,000 feet long, and 600 to 700 feet wide. The court relied on the
coal company’s experts who claimed that the surface would not crack,
and that there would be no damage to the timber, stream, or
249
spring. In denying the injunction, the court found no evidence of
physical damage and stated that a claim for subjacent support
required appreciable damage to the surface estate or diminution in
250
its use. Justices Russell and Stephenson, in a strong dissent, likened
the effect on the surface to the “consequences of a major
251
earthquake.” In referring to the coal company’s expert testimony,
the dissent noted, “‘experts’ can be found to support any
252
proposition.”

243. See id. at 648-49 (rejecting the defendant’s argument because the defendant
failed to introduce evidence demonstrating that subsidence would not have occurred
in the absence of its mining activities).
244. See id. at 650 (noting that a waiver must be clear and unequivocal and that the
Virginia Supreme Court had previously determined that a similar grant of “‘all’ of
the coal along with the ‘usual mining privileges’” did not constitute such a waiver).
245. See Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 387 S.E.2d 783, 785 (Va. 1990) (rejecting
the plaintiff’s contention that the court should award it subjacent support if the
subterranean owner caused any subsidence on the surface, regardless of whether
there is surface damage or diminution of use).
246. Id.
247. The plaintiffs contended that the mining related activities of Clinchfield Coal
Company would result in surface subsidence and further damages. Id. at 784.
248. See Clinchfield Coal Co., 387 S.E.2d at 785 (explaining that in this method,
Clinchfield Coal Company would erect five panels under the plaintiff’s property and
would remove coal from the seam in each panel).
249. See id. (“[T]he evidence of record is sufficient to support the trial court’s
finding that there would not be any appreciable damage to the surface resulting
from Clinchfield’s longwall mining.”).
250. See id. at 786 (requiring surface owners to establish that there is a reasonable
probability that irreparable harm will result from the removal of the subjacent
support in order to be entitled to a prohibitory injunction).
251. Id. at 787 (Russell, J., dissenting).
252. Id. (Russell, J., dissenting) (characterizing as “incredible” the expert
testimony that claimed that the severe subsidence in this case would not have a
negative impact on wells, springs, surface watercourses, surface drainage, erosion
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In a 1991 Fourth Circuit opinion, Vandyke v. Island Creek Coal Co.,
a homeowner brought an action against a coal operator, alleging
254
subsidence damage to his home and other buildings.
The court
granted summary judgment to the coal company, relying on the
waiver language in the severance deed that granted the right to
remove the coal “without leaving any support for the underlying
strata and without any liability for damage which may result from the
255
breaking of said strata . . . .” The court followed the decision in Ball
256
v. Island Creek Coal Co.,
rejecting the plaintiff’s reliance on
257
258
Stonegap and Phipps v. Leftwich. The pattern of these cases suggests
that Virginia surface owners rarely recover damages for subsidence.
D. West Virginia
Similar to the other state court decisions examined above, West
Virginia courts have found that the right to subjacent support is
absolute, and have held that surface owners need not prove
259
negligence of the coal mining company to recover for subsidence.
Despite the acknowledgement of this right, the West Virginia courts
follow the other state courts in generously interpreting waivers in
favor of coal operators, and in refusing to find harm to surface
260
owners.

control, growing crops, and tree roots).
253. No. 91-3022, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27680, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 22, 1991).
254. The plaintiffs alleged that the mining activities of Island Creek Coal
Company compromised the subjacent support of the plaintiffs’ homes and other
property and that this loss of support damaged the structures. See id. at *2.
255. Id. at *3.
256. 722 F. Supp. 1370 (W.D. Va. 1989). The Vandyke court noted that two years
earlier, the Ball court rejected arguments that were similar to the arguments that
Vandyke attempted to advance in his case. Vandyke, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27680, at
*3-4.
257. 80 S.E. 305 (1916). Vandyke acknowledged that the language in the deed
that conveyed the mineral rights to Island Creek Coal Company appeared to waive
his right to receive subjacent support but cited the Stonegap decision for the
proposition that the court should not enforce the waiver. Vandyke, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27680, at *3.
258. 222 S.E.2d 536 (1976). Vandyke cited the Phipps decision for the proposition
that the court should limit the meaning of the deed’s language to what the parties
likely contemplated upon executing the deed. Vandyke, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
27680, at *4.
259. See, e.g., Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co., 140 S.E. 57, 59 (W. Va. 1927)
(noting this principle, the court stated: “The authorities say that absolute support is
due a surface tract, unless the right thereto is impaired by deed . . . .”).
260. See, e.g., Sendro v. Consolidation Coal Co., 1991 WL 757723, *7 (N.D. W. Va.
Mar. 27, 1991) (reiterating a West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals holding cited
in several West Virginia decisions that “[a] valid written instrument which expresses
the intent of the parties in plain and unambiguous language is not subject to judicial
construction or interpretation.”) (quoting Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co.,
128 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 1962)).
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A West Virginia Court granted summary judgment to a coal
261
company in a 1991 case, Sendro v. Consolidation Coal Co., in which a
262
surface owner alleged damages resulting from longwall mining. In
1984, the plaintiff surface owner entered into a contract with the
263
defendant coal operator. The three-year contract provided that the
coal operator would pay the plaintiff $5,325 and additional amounts
264
for subsidence-related property damage.
The defendant’s mining
activities damaged the plaintiff’s home and the plaintiff refused to
accept the coal company’s offer which was consistent with the
265
contract terms. The 1902 severance deed waived subjacent support,
stating that the coal company may mine “without leaving any support
for the overlying stratus and without liability for any injury which may
266
result to the surface.”
The court concluded that the waiver was
valid and unambiguous, and prohibited any liability for damage that
the defendant’s negligent, or even grossly negligent, mining had
267
caused.
According to the court, the 1902 waiver prevented the
plaintiff from recovering for subjacent support, even if the defendant
was grossly negligent, so plaintiff’s only chance of recovery depended
268
on the contract. The court summarily rejected the plaintiff’s claims
for fraud, emotional pain and suffering, embarrassment, anguish,
and depression, and allowed them to go to trial only on the issue of
269
whether the coal company had breached the 1984 contract.

261. Id.
262. See id. at *8 (concluding that the court would grant summary judgment to
Consolidation Coal Company on two of the three counts but one of the claims raised
questions of fact that a jury must decide).
263. See id. at *1 (noting that on May 15, 1984, the parties signed the contract that
determined the amount of compensation the plaintiffs would receive for longwall
mining-induced damages).
264. See id. (explaining that if the plaintiffs incurred property damage, an
inspection team would assess the amount of damage and issue a report that would be
binding on the parties).
265. The defendant wrote a check in accordance with the findings of a December
8, 1987 inspection but the plaintiff rejected the check and filed suit on January 9,
1989. According to the plaintiff, the defendant: (1) conducted its mining in a
negligent manner; (2) breached the terms of the 1984 contract; and (3) employed
fraud to induce the plaintiff’s agreement to the 1984 contract. See id.
266. Id. at *4.
267. See id. at *5:
[P]laintiffs by their predecessors validly waived any right that they might
have had to subjacent support for the tract in question as well as any right
to recover from defendant for damages resulting from subsidence caused
by negligent or grossly negligent mining. The Court also must conclude
that there is no evidence to support a claim for damages for willful, wanton,
or reckless mining.
268. See id. at *6 (concluding that the 1984 contract provided plaintiffs with a
common law contract option).
269. See id. at *8 (finding that while damages for emotional pain and suffering,
embarrassment, anguish, and depression may be recoverable upon claims of fraud,

DAVIS.PRINTER.DOC

938

7/26/2002 12:38 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 905

Similar to the Sendro case, the court in Schultz v. Consolidation Coal
270
Co., recognized the surface owners’ right to support, but continued
271
the trend to generously interpret waivers. The Schultz court found
272
that a valid waiver of support was not invalidated by the WVSCMRA
273
or the regulations enacted pursuant thereto.
The coal company,
prior to litigation, induced the surface owner to accept $21,500 for
the damage caused to their home by insisting that the company was
not liable to pay any amount for subsidence damage as a result of the
274
deed waiver.
The surface owner argued that the coal company
fraudulently obtained their agreement to accept the damage
settlement because, in fact, the coal company had a duty to pay for all
275
subsidence damage. The court affirmed summary judgment for the
276
coal company, finding no fraud on the part of the coal company.
277
In Rose v. Oneida Coal Co., a West Virginia court denied recovery
278
for damage to a water supply. Surface owners claimed that the coal
operator destroyed the surface owners’ water supply and caused

they are not recoverable, under West Virginia law, upon claims of real property
damage).
270. 475 S.E.2d 467 (W. Va. 1996).
271. See id. at 476-77 (reciting West Virginia common law, and finding that
subjacent support is inherently connected to land, even upon the sale of subsurface
mining rights, if in the absence of a valid waiver); see also Smerdell v. Consolidation
Coal Co., 806 F. Supp. 1278, 1278 (N.D. W. Va. 1992) (ruling that an original deed to
mineral rights, granted to Consolidation Coal Co. by the land owner in privity to the
current land owner, precluded the awarding of compensation for property damage
as a result of subsidence from mining practices).
272. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-1 to 22-3-30 (Michie 1998).
273. See Schultz, 475 S.E.2d at 476 (finding that no fraud could be found on the
part of Consolidation Coal Co. regarding their representation of their
responsibilities to the land owner under the WVSCMRA because the legislative
history behind the statute is “murky at best”); see also id. at 471 n.6 (finding that, in
general, the WVSCMRA does not apply at all to the operation of an underground
mine which adversely affects surface water supplies when that mining took place
prior to October 24, 1992, when applicable federal legislation, which may or may not
cover such incidents, was enacted).
274. See id. at 470 (making clear that while, on many occasions, Consolidation
Coal Co.’s representative asserted to the land owners that they had a choice between
accepting the payment or receiving “nothing” because the mining company was not
liable under the WVSCMRA, the land owners did, nonetheless, consult with legal
counsel before accepting the payment and depositing the funds into their account).
275. See id. at 470 n.2 (pointing out that the land owners initially claimed fraud
based upon the mining firm’s alleged misrepresentation that the firm could mine
within 300 feet of the land owners’ dwelling without permission, but later amended
this claim after their own expert witness testified to the detriment of the theory).
276. See id. at 471 n.8 (finding fault with the land owner’s argument of entitlement
to “property damages” based upon misrepresentations made by the mining company
regarding the company’s duty to repair damages to “structures”). The court refers to
this argument as “mix[ing] apples with oranges.” Id.
277. 466 S.E.2d 794 (W. Va. 1995).
278. See id. (recounting that the “damage” in this case to the surface water actually
consisted of a loss of water from both a house well and from springs upon the land).
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The court found that the SMCRA as
subsidence of the surface.
281
applied only to surface mining, not
well as the WVSCMRA,
underground coal mining, and therefore upheld the lower court’s
282
ruling that there was no recovery for destruction of surface water.
The court did, however, disagree with the lower court as to
subsidence damages and held that under both statutes, the operator
of an underground mine is required to “correct any material damage
resulting from subsidence caused to surface lands, to the extent
technologically and economically feasible by restoring the land to a
condition capable of maintaining the value and reasonably
283
foreseeable uses . . . .”
The court remanded the case for a
284
determination as to subsidence damages.
The courts’ reluctance to impose liability on coal companies causes
turmoil when a dispute arises between a strip miner and a deep mine
285
company with competing interests in the same real estate.
The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was divided on a case
between a surface strip miner and a deep mine coal company who
286
owned the underground rights to the same land.
The surface
287
The
owner’s 1986 deed included a waiver of subjacent support.
strip miner ran a smaller operation, using strip mine methods on the

279. See id. at 796 (recounting that these claims of damage originally arose in
previous litigation between the same parties, resulting in the court’s ruling that a
previous waiver of subjacent support prohibited the awarding of damages under a
common law claim, differentiated from the complaint brought in this case for
damages arising in violation of the WVSCMRA).
280. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
281. See Rose, 466 S.E.2d at 798 (discussing the interplay between state and federal
regulations in which the state regulation, if found to be relatively less stringent, must
give way to the federal regulation (primacy of federal law)).
282. See id. at 798-99 (interpreting the breadth of the WVSCMRA and the SMCRA
based largely upon a plain reading of the language of the legislation, taken as a
whole, to exclude damage done to the surface water by underground mining
operations).
283. Id. at 801.
284. See id. at 731-32 (clarifying, as in previous cases, that recovery under the
pertinent legislation is limited to damage done to the land itself, which is to be
differentiated from damage done to structures upon the land).
285. See generally THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE ONLINE, Mining the Mountains (19982002) (recounting major trends and issues on the subject of strip mining in West
Virginia over the last few years), available at http://www.wvgazette.com/static/
series/mining (last visited Apr. 1, 2002).
286. See Antco, Inc. v. Dodge Fuel Corp., 550 S.E.2d 622, 626 (W. Va. 2001)
(noting how this case differs from the typical surface owner versus mineral owner
case which the court usually hears and detailing the parties’ contractual
relationship).
287. See id. at 625 (reprinting pertinent excerpts of the deed, including the
following portion: “There is excepted and reserved unto the Grantor of the proper
owner thereof, all the several seams of coal and all of the deep [word “deep” inserted
by hand and initialed by the parties ] mining rights . . . All without being liable for
any injury or damage to the surface of the lands . . . .”).
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288

The strip miner
110 acres of which they owned the surface.
eventually found that a limestone quarry was a more profitable use of
289
the property.
The limestone operation required a large rock290
The defendant’s deep mining operations
crushing machine.
caused subsidence that damaged the rock crusher and other quarry
291
equipment. In the process, the defendant violated the terms of its
mining permit by exceeding the area to be legally mined and
292
undermining the land under the quarry. The circuit court granted
summary judgment for the defendant, based partially on the waiver
293
of subjacent support. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals affirmed this ruling but expressed concerns about the
violations of the promises made in the mining permit application,
294
and remanded the case for re-trial.
Justice Davis wrote a strong
dissent, joined by Justice Maynard, expressing concern that coal
operators should not be exposed to liability for language in their
295
permit applications.


288.

Id. Language in the deed which transferred subsurface rights specified:
[W]ithout being liable for any injury or damage to the surface of the lands
and without being required to leave or provide subjacent and lateral
support for the overlying and adjoining strata or surface or anything
therein or thereon including structures or improvements now or hereafter
erected thereon and water or water courses therein or thereon, and without
being liable for any surface damage and damages of any sort howsoever
caused or arising from the removal of, and all operation in connection with
mining said coal by the Grantor or the proper owner . . . ”
289. Antco Inc., 550 S.E.2d at 626.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 627.
292. See id. at 626-27 (citing actual notices of violation served on the defendant
coal company by the State of West Virginia for the same violations which are claimed
in the lawsuit: exceeding the area to be legally mined under permit and improperly
undermining the land underneath the plaintiff’s quarry).
293. Id. at 627 (agreeing with the lower court that a valid waiver was in place when
the subsurface mining took place which caused the surface damage in question, but
disagreeing with the lower court’s second finding that this valid waiver precluded any
further material facts from being considered).
294. See id. at 634 (reasoning not that the plaintiff would necessarily prevail upon
this argument, but that proof of the defendant’s prima facie negligence in violating
its mining permit created issues of material fact that rendered the lower court’s
summary judgement inappropriate).
295. See id. at 635 (Davis, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[i]t is patently unfair to
maintain that deed waivers are permitted under state law, yet render them ineffective
after-the-fact due to the very conduct that was the subject of the waiver.”).
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296

A West
Subsidence can be particularly damaging to graveyards.
Virginia court upheld a jury finding of negligence, where a coal
company’s operations caused cracks and holes to appear in the
297
surface of a family cemetery.
Nonetheless, the court reversed and
remanded the case for a new determination of damages, finding an
award of punitive damages unwarranted absent a showing of wanton
298
or malicious acts.
As this case illustrates, even when the plaintiffs
prove their case against the coal companies, the courts are likely to
deny significant damage awards and keep plaintiffs in the court
system for years, increasing the time and expense required to enforce
rights against the coal companies.
E. Pennsylvania
While there are differences of opinion as to whether Pennsylvania
should be included in the Appalachian coal field states, Pennsylvania
299
has been severely impacted by mining. Like the other Appalachian
states, the Pennsylvania courts are just as likely to grant summary
judgment for coal companies, denying recovery for subsidence, or
300
other damages where a valid waiver is a factor.
In addition to this

296. See Patrick C. McGinley & Barbara S. Webber, Pandora in the Coal Fields:
Environmental Liabilities, Acquisitions, and Dispositions of Coal Properties, 87 W. VA. L.
REV. 665, 683-84 (1995) (outlining the environmental audit which is now required
under federal law, including provisions which make mining inappropriate where it
may cause damage to adjacent or overlying cemeteries); see also Gresham & Jamison,
supra note 213, at 911-14 (giving an overview of the procedures involved in deep
mining and some of the patterns of damage which may result).
297. See Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 379 S.E.2d 388, 390-92 (W. Va. 1989) (recounting
various accounts of the damage which occurred at the family graveyard, including
wide cracks and holes which would require either being refilled or having the bodies
of up to eighteen persons exhumed and reburied elsewhere).
298. See id. at 394-95 (assigning error to both the awarding of punitive damages in
a case of simple negligence and to the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff could
speak of monetary amounts to the jury in his opening and closing statements which
were not supported by the evidence presented at trial).
299. See generally Penina Kessler Lieber, Comment, Pennsylvania Surface Mining
Legislation: A Regulatory Mire, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 517 (1986) (offering a general
overview of state and federal laws which effect coal mining in the State of
Pennsylvania and providing information about coal mining methods and their
environmental consequences).
300. See generally Culp v. Consol. Pa. Coal Co., No.CIV.A.87-1688, 1989 WL 101553,
at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 1989) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant coal
company, stating that “[t]he plain language of the deeds in the present case makes
clear that the parties anticipated mining of all of the coal in the Pittsburgh seam
without regard to the support of the surface”); Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 102
A.2d 893 (Pa. 1954) (finding that a deed which reserved all coal in and under surface
of land together with right to mine that coal without liability for damages to the land
constituted an implied waiver of grantee’s right to surface support); Charnetski v.
Miner’s Mills Coal Mining Co., 113 A. 683 (Pa. 1921) (upholding lower court’s
judgment for defendant coal company, finding that land was deeded to plaintiff
without rights to surface support); Atherton v. Clearview Coal Co., 110 A. 298 (Pa.
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problem, Pennsylvania has by far the highest number of total deaths
from coal worker’s pneumoconiosis (“black lung”), with nearly nine
301
thousand deaths between 1987 and 1996. Pennsylvania was one of
302
the first states to enact a statute regulating subsidence, in 1966.
Coal mining operators, however, are required to prevent subsidence
damage to public buildings, dwellings and cemeteries to the extent
303
technologically and economically feasible.
The statute, by its
304
language, does not prohibit planned subsidence.
A U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania granted summary judgment
for a coal operator in a subsidence case in Culp v. Consol. Pennsylvania
305
The owner of superincumbent interests sued the coal
Coal Co.
operator for longwall mining damage to both the surface and
306
superincumbent seams to which he held title.
The defendant’s
rights to mine under the plaintiff’s land arose from forty-eight coal
severance deeds executed in the early 1900s, and from this the
defendant claimed the right to cause subsidence of overlying mineral
307
interests.
Each individual deed included a waiver of the right to

1920) (upholding a ruling for the defendant coal company based upon the language
of the waiver, stating that “[w]hat was reserved was the right to mine and remove all
the coal underlying, without liability, under any circumstances, for any damage to
the surface . . . .”); Weakland v. Cymbria Coal Co., 105 A. 558 (Pa. 1918) (finding for
defendant coal company based upon waiver which stated “in clearest terms the
intention of the grantor that it should not be liable for damages for failure to
support the surface”); Commonwealth ex rel. Keator v. Clearview Coal Co., 100 A. 820
(Pa. 1917) (ruling in favor of the defendant coal company, based upon written
waiver, seeking to mine coal under a public school); Stilley v. Pittsburgh Buffalo Co.,
83 A. 478 (Pa. 1912) (ruling in favor of defendant coal company on basis of waiver
meeting the requirement of containing “apt words or implication”).
301. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, PUB. NO. 2000105, WORK-RELATED LUNG DISEASE SURVEILLANCE REPORT (1999); see also NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, PUB. NO. 2000-105, CRITERIA FOR A
RECOMMENDED STANDARD OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO RESPIRABLE COAL MINE DUST,
(1995) (providing a broad overview of the many health risks associated with coal
mining, including those of pneumoconiosis).
302. See The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1406.1-1406.21 (West 1998).
303. See People United to Save Homes v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Nos. 1855C.D.2000
and 1938C.D.2000, 2001 WL 1472632, at *6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 21, 2001)
(interpreting The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.5).
304. See id. (refuting the argument that a mining company must avoid all activity
under public property if subsidence will occur as a result).
305. 1989 WL 101553, at *1.
306. See id. (listing the plaintiff’s complaints against defendant coal company and
the relief sought, including declaratory judgment that the plaintiff has a right to
surface support, an injunction against further mining activities, and damages for
nuisance and trespass).
307. See id. at *1-3 (differentiating ten distinct language variations from among
the several dozen deeds, and finding that all ten variations “uniformly and expressly
authorize the removal of all of the coal in the Pittsburgh seam, without liability for
damages”).

DAVIS.PRINTER.DOC

2002]

7/26/2002 12:38 PM

REPARATIONS FOR THE COAL MINERS OF APPALACHIA

943

308

The court granted summary judgment for the
subjacent support.
309
defendant based on the waiver language.
310
Similarly, in Porter v. Consolidated Coal Co., the court granted
311
summary judgment to a coal operator relying on waiver language.
The severance deeds waived “all surface damages or damages of any
312
sort arising there from, or from the removal of all of said coal.”
Surface owners sued the coal operator for conversion, trespass,
private nuisance, and negligence because the coal operator planned
to use longwall mining to extract coal, which would have caused
313
subsidence of the surface land.
The court found it irrelevant that
longwall mining techniques were known at the time of the severance
314
deed because of the broad waiver language.
Each of the
jurisdictions indicated above is similar in broadly interpreting and
strictly enforcing waivers of support and surface damage,
disregarding the legislative intent in more recent regulations
315
requiring restoration of the surface.
V. ADVERSE POSSESION
The coal operators are also favored in adverse possession suits,
where mineral owners are allowed to benefit from the adverse
316
possession of the surface estate. Surface owners’ claims of adverse

308. See id. at *3 (reviewing ten categories of deeds and finding that each category
contained language, such as “hereby waiving all damages arising therefrom,”
expressly waiving the right to recover damages for removing support).
309. See id. at *14 (holding that the language of the deed clearly and
unambiguously granted the defendant the right to remove all coal in the seam
without liability for damages).
310. No. 86-1396, 1989 WL 101553, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1989) (cited as
Exhibit A in Culp v. Consol. Pa. Coal Co., No. 97-1688, 1989 WL 101553 (W.D. Pa. May
4, 1989)).
311. See id. at *17 (finding that the language in the severance deeds waiving
liability for subsidence damage was not ambiguous).
312. Id. at *16.
313. See id. at *14 (stating plaintiff’s allegations that defendant’s use of longwall
mining would reduce the value of the surface and subsurface estates).
314. See id. at *15, *17 (addressing plaintiff’s argument that when the deeds were
executed, the plaintiffs could not have contemplated that longwall mining would
cause subsidence, but finding no language in the deeds restricting defendant’s use of
specific mining techniques).
315. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1202(a)-(b) (1994) (establishing a nationwide program to protect society and the
environment from the adverse effects of surface mining and to assure that the rights
of surface owners are protected from mining operations); 30 C.F.R. § 816.133 (2001)
(requiring disturbed areas to be restored, in a timely manner, to the condition that
would support the uses the land was capable of supporting before the mining); see
also Mickey Webster, Recent Developments in Surface Mining: An Examination of Black
Mountain and Bragg v. Robertson, 15 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 267, 269 (2001)
(providing an overview of the regulations for surface mining operations).
316. See, e.g., Clevinger v. Bull Creek Coal Co., 98 S.E.2d 670, 672 (Va. 1957)
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317

possession of the mineral rights rarely succeed. In Clevinger v. Bull
318
the Virginia court held that possession and
Creek Coal Co.,
cultivation of the surface is presumed to be possession for the benefit
of the owner of the minerals, so the land could not be considered
319
abandoned.
The effect of this decision was to set aside a grant of
fee from the Commonwealth to the possessor of the surface, so that
320
the mineral rights of the coal company were not affected.
321
In Ventro v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., a 1958 Virginia case, the court
denied the surface owner’s claim of adverse possession of coal
322
rights.
The surface owner had sporadically mined coal for his
323
The surface
household use, using a wheelbarrow and hand tools.
324
owner also sold coal to neighbors and to local schools.
The coal
company had paid the taxes on the coal, and protested when the
325
Although
surface owner leased the coal rights to a third party.
acknowledging that mineral rights could be adversely possessed, the
court deemed the surface owner’s mining and selling of coal too
326
sporadic to make an effective adverse possession claim.
327
In Mountain Mission School, Inc. v. Buchanan Realty Corp., the court
again denied adverse possession of the mineral rights to the surface

(holding that cultivation of the surface land shows that the land is not abandoned
and therefore, inures to the benefit of the owner of the coal estate).
317. See, e.g., Ventro v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 103 S.E.2d 254, 261 (Va. 1958)
(holding that a surface owner’s sporadic mining of coal does not establish adverse
possession of mineral rights).
318. 98 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1957).
319. See id. at 672 (describing that at common law, when the mineral estate has
been severed from the surface estate, the owner of the surface holds possession for
the benefit of the mineral owner, as a bailee).
320. See id. (holding that surface land that had been cultivated for forty-three years
cannot be considered “waste and unappropriated land” subject to grant by the
Commonwealth and therefore the land inures to the benefit of the coal estate).
321. 103 S.E.2d 254 (Va. 1958).
322. See id. at 261 (holding that Ventro’s possession of the coal was not actual,
open, notorious, and hostile).
323. See id. at 259 (reviewing testimony of witnesses who stated that Ventro mined
some coal, but no machinery was used and there was no indication of commercial
mining).
324. See id. at 259-60 (stating that Ventro sold small quantities of coal and made
oral claims of ownership of the coal).
325. See id. at 258 (describing previous conveyances of the land and plaintiff’s
claim of adverse possession of coal and minerals).
326. See id. at 261:
[T]he nature of his sporadic and limited mining operations was in keeping
with the recognized relations existing between surface owners and owners
of the coal and mineral rights.
His mining operations were not
antagonistic to the interests of [the owners of the mineral estate] but were
tacitly permitted, and thus not adverse to their ownership of the coal and
other minerals.
327. 151 S.E.2d 403 (Va. 1966).
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328

To determine whether the surface owner could make a
owner.
claim of adverse possession of the mineral estate, the court required
329
evidence of commercial mining, which was not present. Kentucky
330
courts found similar results in White Log Jellico Coal Co. v. Zipp and
331
Very few cases exist where a surface owner has
Ward v. Woods.
332
prevailed on a claim of adverse possession of a mineral estate.
Courts have also favored coal operators in condemnation
333
proceedings. When the mineral rights were condemned in a recent
Kentucky case, the court denied any share of the condemnation
proceeds to the surface owner who had reserved the right to extract
334
coal for household uses.
As this case illustrates, courts generally
favor mineral owners to the detriment of surface owners not only in
335
adverse possession cases, but other legal proceedings as well.
VI. DEATH AND DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY MINING DISASTERS
The devastating impact of coal mining on the people of Appalachia
is also evident in the numbers of miners killed or maimed while
working in the mines. Between 1930 and 1972, a total of 1.5 million
336
miners were injured in the mines.
Between March 18, 1839 and
September 23, 2001, 15,196 people were killed in 717 mining
337
disasters. On December 26, 1945, twenty-four men died on Straight
Creek in Bell County, Kentucky, in an underground mine fire and
338
Four months later, one hundred and eleven men
explosion.

328. Id.
329. See id. at 407 (holding that the school’s ownership of the surface was mere
possession of the surface only and not adverse possession of the mineral estate
because there had never been commercial mining of the land).
330. 32 S.W.3d 92, 95 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that there was “no behavior
sufficiently hostile or notorious” in part because the mining did not take place for
the fifteen years that the statute required for adverse possession).
331. 310 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Ky. 1958) (finding that removal of some coal for domestic
use did not suffice for a surface owner’s adverse possession claim).
332. See Diederich v. Ware, 288 S.W.2d 643, 647-48 (Ky. 1956) (holding that
surface owner prevailed on an adverse possession claim because the owners of the
mineral estate were on notice and the surface owner operated the two oil wells).
333. See, e.g., Bailey v. K.Y.B.C. Land Corp., 39 S.W.3d 29, 31 (Ky. App. 2001)
(awarding all proceeds from condemnation of the mineral estate to the coal
operator).
334. See id. (stating that the surface owner’s right to mine coal for household
purposes does not diminish the coal operator’s ownership of all mineral rights).
335. See id. (holding that the only compensation the surface owner could receive
would be from condemnation proceedings against the surface estate and not from
the mineral estate).
336. PETERSON, supra note 3, at 50.
337. See Mining Data, available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/data/
disall.html (last visited July 8, 2002). This statistic does not include those miners
killed in incidents that involved fewer than five deaths. Id.
338. See CAUDILL, supra note 13, at 292 (describing the deaths as the “worst
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burned to death in an explosion in Centralia, Illinois.
In 1957, the Bishop mine in Tazewell, Virginia blew up twice,
killing thirty-nine miners the first time and twenty-seven miners the
340
second.
In 1958, at the Amonate mine in the same area, an
341
Cosby Ann Totten, a female
explosion killed twenty-two men.
miner, explained, “[f]rom the time I was a child, someone was always
getting killed or crippled. I was going to funerals when I wasn’t really
342
old enough to know what they were.”
A 1968 mine explosion killed 78 miners at Consolidated Coal
343
Sixteen miners
Company’s mine near Farmington, West Virginia.
344
In 1970, a
had been killed at the same mine in a 1954 explosion.
total of 254 miners died in mining accidents, compared to 203 in
345
1969. As of 1972, one out of twelve miners who began mining early
in his working years could expect to be killed before reaching
346
retirement age.
On December 19, 1984, a faulty air compressor
started a fire that killed twenty-seven coal miners near Orangeville,
347
Utah.
Coal companies claim that mining has become safer in recent
348
The Mine Safety and Health Administration reported
years.
349
seventy-two mining deaths in 2001, the lowest number in decades.

postwar disaster” of the Kentucky plateau).
339. See id. (stating that as a result of the explosions, the union demanded
protection and called for a federal safety code).
340. See RANDALL NORRIS & JEAN-PHILIPPE CYPRÉS, WOMEN OF COAL 16 (Univ. Press
of Ky. 1996) (recounting the story of Cosby Ann Totten, a female miner, who did not
want to go into the mines because of the possibility of explosions).
341. See id. (explaining that three of her relatives were killed in the Amonate mine
explosion).
342. Id.
343. See PETERSON, supra note 3, at 48-49 (noting that twenty-four investigations
between 1963 and 1968, conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Mines found that the mine
violated federal regulations and other safety standards).
344. Id. at 49 (describing the 1954 and 1968 explosions and the union’s
inadequate response to safety violations).
345. Id. at 50 (stating that despite a 1969 federal mine safety law, coal mining
“remains the nation’s most dangerous industrial occupation”); see also Ben A.
Franklin, The Scandal of Death and Injury in the Mines, in APPALACHIA IN THE SIXTIES;
DECADE OF REAWAKENING 99, Editor’s Note at 108 (David S. Walls & John B.
Stephenson eds., 1972).
346. See PETERSON, supra note 3, at 48-49 (reporting that evidence suggests that
coal mining is becoming more dangerous).
347. Cf. Jay Reeves, 4 Dead, 9 Others Missing in Mine, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER,
Sept. 25, 2001, at A4 (describing a mine explosion in Brookwood, Alabama, which
left four dead and nine missing, as “the worst loss of life” since the Utah mining
disaster).
348. See Mining Deaths Reach Record Low in USA, USA TODAY, Jan. 4, 2002, at 3A
(attributing the decline in mine accidents to an historic low to more policing by
regulators and mining companies’ efforts to increase safety).
349. See id. (reporting forty-two deaths in coal mines and thirty deaths in other
mines in 2001).
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Notwithstanding this positive trend, there is no dispute that mining
historically has been one of the most dangerous professions, and
350
continues to threaten the lives of those employed in the mines. On
September 24, 2001, thirteen miners were killed in the Blue Creek
351
The mine roof caved in,
No. 5 mine in Brookwood, Alabama.
hitting electrical equipment, which caused sparks to ignite the
352
methane.
Forty-five minutes later, a second explosion occurred,
353
The dangers of mining are evidenced by the
killing rescuers.
memorial statues to miners, which are in front of many government
354
buildings in Appalachia, honoring the miners killed on the job. In
Appalachia, these mining memorials are more common than military
war memorials.
VII. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
Coal mining operations have caused water, air, and aesthetic
355
For example, the West
pollution of the Appalachian region.
Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”) stated
in May, 2001 that there were eighty-three mine sites in “continuous
356
violation of effluent water pollution limits.”
Although the Federal
357
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act requires restoration
of abandoned mines, the Secretary of the WVDEP admitted that the
state program “does not meet the requirements of federal law

350. See Reeves, supra note 347 and accompanying text.
351. See id. at A1 (stating that four miners and nine rescuers died in the worst
mining accident in the United States since 1984).
352. See id. (explaining that ignited methane caused an explosion in an area of the
mine where six people were working).
353. See id. at A4 (noting that miners who had previously escaped went back into
the mine to rescue workers, but were hit by the second underground explosion).
354. See generally Mining Museums and Miners’ Memorials (noting various mining
museums and memorials that remember the contribution of miners and accidents
that accompanied the mining industry and providing links to each state’s
memorials), at http://www.msha.gov/training/museum/museum.htm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2002). See, e.g., Kimberly Hefling, Coal Towns Bet Their Futures on the Past, THE
SUNDAY GAZETTE MAIL, Nov. 29, 1998, at 1C (noting that a memorial to miners who
died stands outside Portal 31, a mine that operated between 1920 and 1960 in Lynch,
Kentucky).
355. See, e.g., James Huffman, The Allocative Impacts of Mineral Severance: Implications
for the Regulation of Surface Mining, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 201, 222 (1982) (noting that
the diversity of pollution from coal mining is a kind of “externality” where the costs
of mining are passed on to others).
356. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474 (S.D.W. Va.
2001).
357. See 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(2) (1994) (allowing any person having an interest
who is or may be adversely affected by coal mining to bring suit on his/her own
behalf against the Secretary or the appropriate state regulatory authority to compel
compliance with the Act).
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358

A suit by an
because the funding is totally inadequate.”
environmental organization challenging the state program was
359
dismissed.
360
Suits by injured homeowners have been similarly unsuccessful.
In 1944, a Kentucky court denied recovery to a homeowner, finding
no nuisance even though a coal company created a refuse pile that
spontaneously combusted and burned continuously for over three
361
years. Smoke from the refuse pile traveled 2,770 feet to pollute the
air around the plaintiff’s home, making his home uninhabitable and
362
destroying the rental value of a building nearby. The court found
that the broad form deed, originally granted to John C.C. Mayo,
363
waived the right to sue for nuisances.
364
In Mullins v. Beatrice Pocahontas Co., a similarly unsuccessful coal
dust case, a group of homeowners filed a complaint against a coal
operator in Buchanan County, Virginia, seeking damages and
365
injunctive relief, because of air pollution caused by coal dust. The
homeowners alleged that the dust produced by the coal operations
“blackens lawns and trees, destroys crops, ruins the paint on buildings
366
and corrodes cars and trucks.”
The trial court granted summary
367
judgment for the coal operator. When the homeowners appealed,
the court found the severance deeds waived damages from air
368
pollution and dust.
Nevertheless, the court held that “the surface
cannot be burdened by dust that is not the product of ordinary

358. W. Va Highlands Conservancy, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
359. See id. at 481 (finding that a federal court cannot order a state official to
follow state law and dismissing claim for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
360. See generally Consolidation Coal Co. v. Mann, 181 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Ky.
1944) (concluding that the mining operation could not be conducted without
dumping in the location adjacent to the plaintiff’s residence and plaintiff knew this
when he acquired the land).
361. See id. at 395-96 (noting that the homeowner realized that the dumping of
coal could combust and burn, and thus, refused to hold the business liable for
damages for injury to adjacent property).
362. See id. at 395 (stating that the smoke was not constant but often heavy enough
that it would not dissipate and instead travel in damaging quantities to pollute the air
around the homeowner’s residence).
363. See id. at 396 (holding that by taking title to property with the knowledge of
the coal dumping effects, the homeowner “licensed” the coal company to maintain
the nuisance).
364. 432 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1970).
365. See id. at 315 (identifying claim of property owners that the dust from the coal
processing plant destroys property and is unhealthy to breathe).
366. Id.
367. See id. (finding that title to the homeowners’ land derived from deeds that
conferred mineral rights on the coal company).
368. See id. at 317 (reasoning that the homeowner’s deeds reserved, to the coal
company, coal and minerals and the right of prospecting coal and minerals with an
easement for underground haul ways, the coal company is exonerated from liability
for pollution).
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operations or by dust which the coal operator reasonably can
369
The court remanded the case, and the trial court again
control.”
370
found for the coal operator.
When the homeowners appealed,
alleging errors in the standards of proof and admission of hearsay
evidence, the court ignored their allegations and decided that the
trial court may have lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, and
371
remanded once again.
In 1974, the district court decided that
372
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
diversity jurisdiction was proper.
373
decision on jurisdiction in November 1975. After the coal operator
had kept this case in the courts for seven years, the court did not
grant any relief to the homeowners.
374
In the 1974 Kentucky case of Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles,
the court similarly denied relief to surface owners for coal dust
375
376
pollution. The surface owners relied on a nuisance theory. The
court required proof that the coal operator chose a more harmful
procedure when one less harmful was equally available, reversing the
377
trial court’s judgment for the surface owners. Justice Stephenson’s
concurring opinion suggested strict liability should be imposed upon
the mineral owner for damages to the surface owner’s improvements,
378
a theory that has never been accepted by a majority.
In addition to air pollution, coal production causes water
379
pollution. Coke ovens bake coal at 3000 degrees Fahrenheit forty
369. Id. at 319.
370. See Mullins v. Beatrice Pocahontas Co., 489 F.2d 260, 261 (4th Cir. 1974)
(noting that summary judgment had initially been granted against all property
owners, that the court later reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits, and that
after trial, judgment again resulted in favor of the coal company to defeat any
injunction).
371. See id. (remanding the case to consider whether the court had personal
jurisdiction over the coal company because the company was incorporated in
Delaware but never identified its principle place of business).
372. See Mullins v. Beatrice Pocahontas Co., 374 F. Supp. 282, 283 (W.D. Va. 1974)
(determining that diversity jurisdiction should be based on the coal company’s bulk
of corporate activity and principle place of business).
373. See Mullins v. Beatrice Pocahontas Co., 530 F.2d 969, 969 (4th Cir. 1975)
(affirming the district court’s finding but publishing no opinion).
374. 514 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1974).
375. Id.
376. See id. at 662 (applying a nuisance approach to the claim by characterizing
the unreasonableness of a method for mineral recovery as oppressive).
377. See id. at 663 (finding evidence of imprudent operation by the coal company
where the company did not do all it could do to minimize harm and reversing
because of error in the jury instructions).
378. See id. at 667 (Stephenson, J., concurring) (reasoning that because older case
law states that rights contained in a deed to a property do not absolve the mine
operator from liability, strict liability should be imposed for damages to the surface
owners’ improvements and concurring in the reversal judgment only because of an
error in the jury instructions).
379. See generally DUANE LOCKHARD, COAL: A MEMOIR AND CRITIQUE 150-54 (1998)
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eight hours to produce carbonized coal, a higher temperature fuel
380
Many coal seams contain
that is used in steel production.
381
substantial amounts of sulfur.
These coke ovens dump sulfur
382
Water is used to cool the
dioxide into the air as the coal bakes.
carbonized coal before transport, releasing vast clouds of steam,
creating artificial rain that mixes with the sulfur dioxide to cause
383
concentrated acid rain.
When water touches the sulfur, toxic
sulfuric acid is produced, which flows downstream into the creeks
384
and rivers, killing vegetation and wildlife.
The impact on nearby
vegetation and river water is clearly visible in distressed vegetation
385
and discolored water surrounding the coke oven site.
Courts have ignored the environmental damage caused by mining.
A farmer was denied recovery for pollution of a stream and wells by
mine runoff, because the farmer could not prove what percentage of
the pollution was caused by the mine, compared to the percentage of
pollution that was contributed by the farmer’s sawmill and wash
386
house.
Floods occurred in Buchanan County, Virginia causing significant
387
damage to Grundy in 1937, 1957, and again in 1977. It is tempting

(describing the muddy yellow discoloration of most rivers bordering the coal mines
of West Virginia resulting from the dark yellow mine water of diluted sulfuric acid).
380. See generally ABRAHAM GESNER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON COAL, PETROLEUM,
AND OTHER DISTILLED OILS 67-70 (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1968) (1865)
(describing the baking process where a fire burns the furnace at the bottom and a
blast of air is driven through the oven to deprive oxygen, avoid combustion, and
produce carbonized coal).
381. See LOCKHARD, supra note 379, at 150-54 (noting that coals vary in the amount
of sulfur they contain and Midwestern coal is generally heavily composed of sulfur,
whereas Wyoming coal can be burned without producing sulfur).
382. See GESNER, supra note 380, at 67-70 (noting that objections to coke ovens
surround the process of burning which releases vapors through upward distillation).
383. See The Manufacturer of Coke (stating that the gases generated by the heat of
the ovens would burn slowly and emit in the air the odor or rotten eggs, and
explaining that once the controlled burning in the coke oven was complete,
hundreds of gallons of water would flush the finished coke coal), at http://the old
miner.virtualave.net/coke2.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); see also Coal History
(noting that sulfur and nitrogen form during combustion of the coal and can
contribute to the formation of acid rain), at http://vcc.netscope.net/coalhist.htm
(last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
384. See generally Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 40 S.E.2d 298, 299 (Va. 1946)
(describing property damage caused by mine water containing acids and minerals,
which would discolor the ground and kill plants and grasses, as it flowed down the
side of a mountain stream onto the property-owner’s land).
385. See id. (describing the environmental damage caused by the sulfuric
discharge of burning coal that pollutes the air and nearby waters).
386. See id. at 305 (holding that the property-owner did not prove the elements of
his case because he offered no evidence to show what proportion of the damage
resulted from the acts of the coal company and the coal company could not be held
responsible for the entire damage to the property).
387. See Ellen Nakashima, In Grundy, VA., A Debate Ebbs and Flows, WASH. POST.,
May 6, 1997, at B1 (remarking that some residents want to move the town to higher

DAVIS.PRINTER.DOC

2002]

7/26/2002 12:38 PM

REPARATIONS FOR THE COAL MINERS OF APPALACHIA

951

to say that river flooding is an “act of God” and not the responsibility
of man, however, these rivers would not flood if the hillsides had not
been devastated by strip mining, subsidence, and the loss of
388
vegetation.
After a mountain is strip mined, the coal operators push all the dirt
389
and debris over the mountain and into the valleys. If there is heavy
rainfall in the spring, the water washes the debris off the mountain
causing flooding and property damage, as happened in 1977 in
390
Cranks Creek, Kentucky.
Another shocking example of such
flooding occurred in February 1972 when one hundred twenty-five
people were killed and over one thousand homes were destroyed by a
391
coal operator-instigated flood at Buffalo Creek, West Virginia.
The foregoing are merely illustrative examples of the
environmental destruction caused by coal mining operations in
392
Appalachia.
Some of the damage can be reversed or repaired if
393
significant action is taken soon. Decades of coal removal have left
394
the area in desperate need of repair and attention.


ground because of the damage caused by the floods).
388. See GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER 11 (1976) (quoting one
West Virginia flood survivor as stating, “I didn’t see God running any bulldozer”).
389. See NORRIS & CYPRÉS, supra note 340, at 78 (describing how the resulting flood
at Cranks Creek, Kentucky led to new strip mining legislation). See generally Art
Wolfe, Corporations as Ships: An Inquiry into Personal Accountability and Institutional
Legitimacy, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 49, 55 (1987) (describing how unnatural dams were
formed by pushing mine waste into nearby valley streams).
390. See NORRIS & CYPRÉS, supra note 340, at 78 (claiming that it took new
legislation to force coal companies to pay settlements to the flooded community of
Cranks Creek).
391. See generally STERN, supra note 388, at 11 (portraying the survivors’ stories of
the flood at Buffalo Creek and exploring how the resulting lawsuit led to the
uncovering of corporate irresponsibility, and ultimately, accountability).
392. Id. See generally C. PETER GOPLERUD III, COAL DEVELOPMENT AND USE: THE
LEGAL CONSTRAINTS AND INCENTIVES 111-13 (1983) (exploring the adverse
environmental consequences associated with coal mining, and specifically describing
concerns related to mine waste).
393. See Ken Ward Jr., Massey Settles 11 Citations in Summer Flooding, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 2001, at 9A (describing suits against subsidiaries of coal companies
over damage caused by flooding in an effort to curb environmental violations and to
force companies to pay restitution); see also Associated Press, Suit Blames Two Coal
Companies For Flooding That Killed Woman, KY. LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Sept. 29,
2001, at C3 (alleging that woman’s death was due to negligent behavior on the part
of the coal mining companies, who installed improper drains).
394. See Lee Mueller, E. Kentuckians Suspect Removal of Earth’s Surface Increased
Runoff Damage, KY. LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 7, 2001, at A1 (quoting the
director of Pike County Emergency Services as stating, “You know that there’s got to
be some relationship there . . . It’s never happened like this before. You take all the
trees and strip the forest floor from the hillsides and there’s nothing there to deter
the runoff.”).
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VII. HEALTH IMPACT
Coal operations cause black lung, cancer, eye problems, and other
health effects on both miners and residents living near the coal
395
Tobacco use by coal workers exacerbates many of the
fields.
396
symptoms associated with these illnesses.
Worse still, miners’
mortality rate from respiratory diseases has been estimated at four
397
Edith Crabtree, from Man,
times that of the general population.
West Virginia, stated:
My father was killed by black lung. I lost four brothers to black
lung. My first husband had black lung when he died, and my
second husband died from black lung . . . Women and children live
in the coal fields, too, and they breathe coal dust just like the men
do, and they end up with asthma. I even know some women
who’ve died from black lung . . . but they couldn’t get any
compensation because they weren’t coal miners.398

Many doctors, as well as modern mine owners, allege that black
399
lung is a disease of the past.
Recent regulations and better
ventilation techniques have improved the air quality in mines
400
significantly. However, such improvements are still very recent, and
usually employed by only the largest and most technologically
401
advanced mining companies. Thus, black lung remains a key issue
within the coal mining community today.
For example, between 1987 and 1996, the National Center for
Health Statistics reported that a total of 18,245 coal workers died

395. See generally J. DAVITT MCATEER, COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY: THE CASE OF
WEST VIRGINIA 105-11 (1970) (noting the critical role doctors play in Appalachian
coal mining areas because of the constant need for medical testimony during
workers’ compensation and social security disability disputes).
396. See BARBARA ELLEN SMITH, DIGGING OUR OWN GRAVES: COAL MINERS AND THE
STRUGGLE OVER BLACK LUNG DISEASE 211-12 (1987) (listing the individual and
environmental factors which potentially affect the development of black lung disease,
including smoking).
397. See CAROL A. B. GIESEN, COAL MINER’S WIVES: PORTRAITS OF ENDURANCE 56
(1995) (approximating that one of every ten coal miners will die from the
consequences of black lung).
398. NORRIS & CYPRÉS, supra note 340, at 20.
399. See SMITH, supra note 396, at 217-18 (stating that, in 88.5% of modern cases
reviewed, there was insufficient evidence of black lung, and also suggesting that the
“prospects of receiving financial benefits” encouraged miners to “create symptoms”
related to black lung).
400. See, e.g., Mandatory Safety Standards-Underground Coal Mines, 30 C.F.R. § 75
(2001) (requiring a minimum percentage of oxygen and setting maximum levels for
noxious gases); see also Federal Mine Safety Agency Announces Improved Ventilation
Rules, MSHA News Release No. 96-005 (Mar. 11, 1996) (improving the safety of
workers by implementing new rules regarding ventilation in the coal mines, as
ventilation is the primary means of preventing dangerous accumulations of explosive
gases in the mines).
401. See Franklin, supra note 345, at 101-02; HARRY M. CAUDILL, A DARKNESS AT
DAWN 22 (1976).
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402

The Appalachian coal fields of West
from black lung disease.
Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee account for 5,727 of
403
these deaths, with an additional 8,898 from Pennsylvania alone.
The Mine Safety and Health Administration also reported that while
about 50 percent of the samples of coal mine air exceeded the
permissible dust exposure limit in 1970, this number was reduced
404
drastically to less than fifteen percent for the years 1982 to 1994.
Although this appears to be a vast improvement, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration samples indicated that over thirty
percent of the 1984 and 1985 samples exceeded the permissible
exposure limit, and over forty percent of the samples exceeded the
405
limit in 1986.
Moreover, the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health has indicated that the risk of affliction with black
lung increases dramatically with length of time in the mining
406
profession.
Between fourteen and forty percent of tested
employees who had worked more than thirty years in the mines had
407
x-rays indicating black lung disease.
In addition to the respiratory problems that miners face, back pain
408
often plagues those working in the mines. Where seams of coal are
too thin for shaft or deep mining, drift mines are used to tunnel into
409
the sides of a mountain. The seams in drift mines are typically less
than three feet thick, requiring the miners to work all day on their
410
hands and knees. “For a miner who avoids being crippled, burned
or buried alive, the usual question is which will give out first—his

402. Work-Related Lung Disease (WoRLD) Surveillance Report 1999, NATIONAL CENTER
HEALTH STATISTICS [hereinafter WoRLD 1999] (tabulating total number of
deaths and potential years lost due to coal workers’ pneumoconiosis for each state
and the District of Columbia), at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/W99T2-5.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2002).
403. Id.
404. Work-Related Lung Disease Surveillance Report 1996, National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH) Pub. No. 96-134.
405. Id.
406. See WoRLD 1999, supra note 402 (tabulating the number and percentage of
miners found to have evidence of black lung, as determined through an X-ray study
completed by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health).
407. Id.
408. See GIESEN, supra note 397, at 43-44 (illustrating the cramped conditions of
the mines by noting that men often entered the mines lying down).
409. See JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 5 (1997) (explaining the differences between the three ways in which
coal is mined in Buchanan County, Virginia—strip mining, drift mining, and deep
shaft mining).
410. See id. (enumerating the disadvantages that drift miners face compared to
other deep shaft miners, including small work areas and lack of unionization); see
also GIESEN, supra note 397, at 44 (explaining that bigger working areas would cost
the coal companies money, so tunnels are only as wide and high as necessary).
FOR
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411

lungs, his back or his knees.”
The coal industry also is responsible for health problems other
than miners’ black lung and back problems. Air and water pollution
from the coal industry have caused an increased incidence of eye
problems, respiratory disease and cancers in those residing in coal
mining areas. According to the National Cancer Institute, the
Appalachian coal counties are in the highest ten percent of the
nation for cancer mortality for white women, and in the highest
twenty percent of the United States for white males for mortality from
412
all forms of cancer. A principal mining region, McDowell County,
West Virginia, is among the lowest eight counties in the United States
for life expectancy; Perry County, Kentucky and Mingo County, West
413
Virginia are not much better.
The health of all Appalachian
residents has been adversely affected by the coal industry, not only
414
the health of those miners who work underground.
IX. TAX REVENUE
Although Appalachian mountain land is assessed at low values, for
years many coal companies paid little or no taxes on their mineral
415
rights. Some surface owners were unaware that their land had been
severed, because the severance occurred decades ago and title
416
searches and legal representation are not customary for purchasers.
If the tax assessor was similarly uninformed, the surface owner may
417
have been the sole taxpayer.
Furthermore, some coal operators attempted to influence the tax
assessors by developing close relationships with those in charge of
taxation through hiring the chairman of the Board of Tax

411. TUCKER, supra note 409, at 5.
412. Susan S. Devesa, et al., Atlas of Cancer Mortality in the United States: 195094, NIH Pub. No. 99-4564 (1999).
413. See Ryan O’Neil, Life Expectancy Across The Country (listing counties with lowest
life expectancy at birth for females born in 1990 as McDowell County, WV (8th
lowest); Perry County, KY (11th lowest) and Mingo, WV (13th lowest)), at
http://www.insure.com/life/expectancy 199-4.html (last updated Feb. 1, 1999).
414. See NORRIS & CYPRÉS, supra note 340, at 20 (stating that everyone—men,
women, and children—should have medical insurance to cover the effects of the coal
industry).
415. See MCATEER, supra note 395, at 175-80 (finding that coal companies are
paying about one-tenth of the property taxes in West Virginia, and yet the companies
own almost forty-four percent of the land).
416. See generally Michelle Andrea Wenzel, Comment, The Model Surface Use and
Mineral Development Accommodation Act: Easy Easements for Mining Interests, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 607, 613-18 (1993) (detailing the history of severed mineral ownership and
noting that, by 1990, the concept of estate severance was well-established in the
United States).
417. CAUDILL, supra note 29, at 65.
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Supervisors to represent them, as their attorney or accountant.
Coal companies kept assessments on the mineral rights, real estate,
419
and miners’ homes low to minimize their taxes. Consequently, the
government itself was required to meet the demands of the rising
populations servicing the mines by providing roads, schools, and
420
postal services. Yet, as the counties had insufficient tax revenue to
properly meet these demands, counties began to issue bonds to pay
for roads and schools, thereby creating a treacherous debt load from
421
1914 to 1929.
This public debt caused the Depression to hit
422
Appalachia harder than other regions, and recover more slowly.
In 1967, the owners of ninety percent of the land in Clairfield,
423
Tennessee, paid only four percent of the taxes. This situation has
been remedied in many counties today, with twenty-nine coal seams
identified as taxable by the Buchanan County, Virginia Commissioner
424
of Revenue. Now, although the coal seams generate revenue, strip
mining and other mining effects can remove real estate from the tax
base, thereby lowering the collected revenues of towns and counties
425
already stressed. If property is strip-mined or otherwise devastated
by subsidence or detritus from coal operations, the surface owner
may abandon it and refuse to pay taxes, unconcerned that the
426
authorities may take the land in a tax sale. Abandoned mines are a
common sight throughout Appalachia, and this wasted land

418. See CAUDILL, supra note 13, at 126 (noting that local politicians were regularly
paid by the coal companies—developing a direct, but largely ignored, conflict of
interest).
419. See id. (alleging that the coal companies suggested the value of their property
worth and how much of it was to be taxed).
420. See id. at 126-27 (decrying the fact that governments over-taxed individual
citizens to meet the burden of essential local services, while coal companies retained
low property taxes).
421. See id. at 129 (adding that the counties could barely pay the interest on the
bonds with such low taxes on coal companies, let alone affect the principal).
422. See id. at 167 (stating that the principal causes and effects of the Depression
had been getting progressively worse in Appalachia long before the stock market
crash of 1929).
423. See NORRIS & CYPRÉS, supra note 340, at 60 (describing the recollections of
Marie Cirillo, a member of Alliance for Communities Service in Clairfield,
Tennessee, of the results of a study conducted by law students at Vanderbilt
University in 1967).
424. Telephone Interview by Michael Platt, Associate Articles Editor for the
American University Law Review with Vicki M. Davis, Office of the Commissioner of
Revenue, Buchanan County, Virginia (Feb. 22, 2002).
425. See Huffman, supra note 355, at 216, 229 (noting that strip mining is a process
that results in the partial or total destruction of the surface land, leaving it useless
and valueless); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707, 711
(3d Cir. 1985) (noting one purpose of a Pennsylvania statute regulating subsidence
and bituminous coal mining was to preserve a tax base for municipalities and
enhance the economic welfare of the state).
426. CAUDILL, supra note 13, at 317.
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symbolizes lost revenue to the towns and lost value to the farmers
427
who could have made use of the surface.

X. IMPACT ON EDUCATION
Because the wages paid to miners are higher than most available
alternative employment, residents in the Appalachian coal fields are
428
discouraged from seeking higher education. Minimum wage for an
inexperienced miner employed by the Consol Energy mine in
Oakwood, Buchanan County, Virginia, was $60,000 in 2001, more
429
than double the average wage in any other industry in the area. In
the first quarter of 2001, the average weekly wage in Buchanan
430
County, Virginia, was $559 for an annual average of $29,068. This
average is skewed because mining is the top employment category,
431
involving 23% of the area jobs. The average mining weekly wage
432
was $973, nearly double the average of all industries.
Fewer residents in the coal fields finish high school or attend
433
college, in part because of the financial opportunities in the mines.
According to the 1990 census, in Leslie County, Kentucky, only 6.6
percent of the population over the age of twenty-five had attained a
Bachelor’s degree or higher, and 40.4% were high school
434
graduates. Pike County, Kentucky, had only 7.7% college graduates

427. See Laurence Hammack, Prison Profits Replace a Waning Coal-Mining Industry,
ROANOKE TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at A1 (noting that the “landscape of far Southwest
Virginia is replete with reminders of how coal was once king,” including the common
sight of abandoned mines).
428. Miners were not always paid high wages. Prior to the unions, miners often
worked long hours for only a few dollars per day, not enough to feed a family.
PETERSON, supra note 3, at 74-75. The unions also caused problems for the miners,
making promises that were not fulfilled and causing battles between workers and
employers. The union wars are too extensive a topic to be adequately covered in this
article. For an excellent discussion, see id. at 24-94.
429. Interview with Terry Suder, Mine Superintendent, Consol Coal Co. (Aug. 8,
2001).
430. See Virginia’s Electronic Labor Market Access, Here’s Average Weekly Wage
Information for Buchanan County (performing data research for Buchanan County,
Virginia), at http://www.velma.vec.state.va.us/vajs/front.asp (last visited Feb. 22,
2002).
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. See Steve Myers, Mining Ushered in Era of Rural Dependence, CHARLESTON DAILY
MAIL, May 3, 1999 (arguing that the existence of company coal towns, catering to
most necessities of daily life, prevented a prosperous middle class from developing in
Appalachia, which resulted in low levels of higher education and training), at
http://www.dailymail.com/static/specialsections/lookingback/lb05031.htm
(last
visited Feb. 22, 2002).
434. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 232 (12th ed.
1994).
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435

In McDowell County, West
and 50.2% high school graduates.
Virginia, only 4.6% were college graduates and 42.3% were high
436
school graduates.
In Buchanan County, Virginia, only 6.4% were
437
college graduates and 42.5% high school graduates. These statistics
are in stark contrast to the national averages of 20.3% college
438
graduates and 75.2% high school graduates in 1990.
Other coal
counties in Appalachia have similar statistics, with a little more than
one-third as many college graduates and about two-thirds as many
439
high school graduates as the national average.
The problems of under-education in Appalachia have existed for
440
decades. In 1972, 21.3% of the population of McDowell County,
441
West Virginia was illiterate. At that time, the average mountaineer
had only a sixth grade education and the illiteracy rate in the
442
Appalachians was the highest in the nation. Although the coal
companies promised company schools in the coal towns, the teachers
443
often lacked even a high school diploma.
The schools have
improved, but the dependence on coal has left the region with
444
insufficient career opportunities even when education is available.

435. Id.
436. Id. at 624.
437. Id. at 582.
438. Id. at 6.
439. Of the counties I have identified as constituting the Appalachian region, see
supra note 2, the unweighted average percentage of persons over the age of twentyfive who have attained an education level of high school or better, according to the
1990 Census, is 49.9%, which is only two-thirds the national average. The
unweighted average percentage of those over the age of twenty-five who have
received a Bachelor’s degree or higher is 7.6%, which is about one-third the national
average. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 218, 323, 498,
512, 582, 596, 610, 624 (12th ed. 1994).
440. See Amy C. Bushaw, Small Business, Local Culture, and Global Socitey: Some
Examples From the United States, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 223, 235 (2001) (noting
that the Appalachian region is “marked by low levels of education, high
unemployment, early marriages, high rates of infant mortality, and lower than
average life expectancies”).
441. See PETERSON, supra note 3, at 6 (recounting the results of a survey conducted
by the Council of Southern Mountains, West Virginia Branch, McDowell County
Chapter, Inc., an organization established under President Johnson’s War on
Poverty). At the same time, the national illiteracy rate was 7.8%. Id.
442. See id. at 21-22 (explaining that the nature of the land in Appalachia forced
its settlers to live under pioneer conditions even into the twentieth century, leaving
them generally “easy to exploit, easy to promise to, and easy to betray”; one such
promise being the promise of education).
443. See id. at 22 (describing the promise of education as merely one of several
betrayals perpetrated by coal companies, who under-financed schools and supplied
inadequate teachers).
444. See generally Myers, supra note 433 (stating that there were relatively few local
landowners and that the coal companies owned the towns).
As a result,
independently owned small businesses never took hold and a prosperous middle
class never developed. Id. Therefore, people depended on corporate interests to
sustain their livelihood, leaving few career opportunities. Id.
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When a vocational school opened in McDowell County in the 1960s,
ninety-five percent of its graduates left the Appalachian region
445
because of a lack of employment opportunities at home.
XI. REPARATIONS
The federal government has poured a substantial amount of
money into Appalachia in the form of disability, food stamps, black
446
lung benefits, and other programs. These funds, however, have not
significantly improved the lives of Appalachian residents because
447
these benefits have been paid to individuals.
The author suggests
that funding provided to community and local government projects
would have a greater impact, and that it is time for a more
comprehensive program to lift this region up to the level of the rest
of the country.
The author proposes federal legislation to pay reparations to the
residents of Appalachia, who lost their land, health, and standard of
448
living, all for the production of coal. Reparations provide a remedy

445. See PETERSON, supra note 3, at 9 (noting this was part of an exodus, during the
1960s, of twenty-eight percent of the population of McDowell County, West Virginia,
due to lack of jobs). But see Andrew M. Isserman, Socio-Economic Review of Appalachian
Economy, 16 (Nov. 1996) (noting that every one of a group of fifty-four growing high
wage industries are present in Appalachia), available at http://www.arc.gov/
research/pdf/evolve.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2002). Isserman’s report, provided by
the Appalachian Regional Commission, states that “[t]he presence of the growing,
high-wage industries in Appalachia is encouraging testimony that the hoped for
diversification of the Appalachian economic base and its more favorable integration
into the national economy is occurring.” Id. at 19. Isserman concludes that while
much of Appalachia is growing faster, economically, than much of the nation, there
are still parts lagging behind, especially in Central Appalachia. Id. at 23.
446. See Isserman, supra note 445, at 2 (reporting that since 1964, more than two
thousand miles of highways have been completed to reduce isolation, and $14 billion
has been spent to help Appalachia “achieve a diversified economic base and a
competitive, self-sustaining economy”); see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036 (1994 & Supp.
V 1999) (outlining food stamp program); 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1994) (outlining
black lung benefits).
447. See Lawrence E. Wood & Gregory A. Bischak, Progress and Challenges in
Reducing Economic Distress in Appalachia: An Analysis of National and Regional Trends
Since 1960 1 (Jan. 2000) (finding that about one-quarter of the counties designated
by the Appalachian Regional Commission as “distressed” in 1960 remain distressed
today), available at http://www.arc.gov/research/pdf/progress.pdf (last visited Feb.
22, 2002).
448. See Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1657, 1660 n.8 (1999) (reserving the term “reparations” for “payments made by
governments to injured parties who have no reasonable expectation of recovery in
court”). Professor Levmore speaks of payments that are made long after the harm is
suffered and long after “a regretted legal regime has been changed.” Id. at 1660.
While some courts, through the passage of time, regret, and little government
opposition might order the government to make reparative payments, Professor
Levmore states that the recent notable payments have all been legislative in origin.
Id. at 1686 n.66. Compared to the domestic context, international reparations (or
war reparations) are “state-to-state political remedies for violations of international
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to a group for injustices which have been perpetrated against them.
450
The focus of reparations is generally on past harm, although the
evidence of current distress of the Appalachian region should
provide additional entitlement to financial assistance. Reparations
451
452
have been paid to Native Americans,
Hawaiians,
Holocaust
453
victims, and Japanese Americans incarcerated during World War
454
Studies are now underway, and suits expected, to demand
II.
455
All of
reparations for the descendents of former African slaves.

law.” Id. at 1691. See also K. Lee Boyd, Are Human Rights Political Questions?, 53
RUTGERS L. REV. 277, 298-99 (2001) (arguing that war reparations differ significantly
from the judicial remedies sought for violation of international human rights laws).
Professor Boyd states that “the purpose of war reparations is to discharge state
responsibility” for breach of international law. Id. at 299. Unlike judicial remedies,
war reparations occur as a result of the political process—a product of international
negotiations that result in legislation much like treaty provisions. Id. at 299-300.
449. See Hall, supra note 12, at 11 (describing the purpose of reparations in the
context of compensating African Americans for a long history of oppression and
discrimination).
450. See Levmore, supra note 448, at 1658.
451. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1408 (1994) (appropriating funds for payment of
judgments assessed by the Indian Claims Commission); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629h
(1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing for settlement of all land, hunting, and fishing
claims of Alaskan native groups); see also Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations:
Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 484 n.22
(1998) (describing individual reparative payments made to Native American tribes).
452. See S.J. Res. 19, 103d Cong., Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510, 1513 (1993)
(apologizing for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii); Kimberly A. Costello,
Note, Rice v. Cayetano: Trouble in Paradise for Native Hawaiians Claiming Special
Relationship Status, 79 N.C. L. REV. 812, 832 (2001) (indicating that “[f]ederal
funding and grants to Hawaiian natives have exceeded more than $440 million in
recent years”).
453. See Levmore, supra note 448, at 1690 n.83 (noting that the West German
government enacted legislation in the 1950s authorizing payments to Holocaust
survivors and Israel).
454. See 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 1989b-1989b-9 (1994) (authorizing restitution for the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II); Robert Westley, Many
Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429,
450-51 (1998) (describing the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 and the reparations paid to
Japanese Americans).
455. See Anthony Gifford, The Legal Basis of the Claim for Slavery Reparations, HUM.
RTS., Spring 2000, at 16 (proposing a legal framework for African Americans to assert
a claim for reparations, based on a Crime Against Humanity theory); Hall, supra note
12, at 11 (exploring underlying issues of race in the United States using the case of
reparations for African Americans); Tuneen E. Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around
Your Own Front Door: Examining the Argument for Legislative African American
Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 682 (1999) (arguing that an “equitable society”
cannot be achieved without paying reparations to African Americans, and assessing
the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 as a precedent for race-based reparations); Donald
Aquinas Lancaster, Jr., Comment, The Alchemy and Legacy of the United States of
America’s Sanction of Slavery and Segregation: A Property Law and Equitable Remedy Analysis
of African American Reparations, 43 HOW. L.J. 171, 172-73 (2000) (arguing that the U.S.
government, through its common law and Supreme Court decisions, ratified the
practice of slavery and segregation, and suggesting several legal theories under which
African Americans could assert a reparations claim against the federal government).
See generally Randall Robinson, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES BLACKS (2000)
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these movements for reparations provide useful precedents for how
reparations can be used as a means to address past wrongs. Although
the injustices inflicted upon these groups vary in degree and kind, in
each situation, physical and financial harm was inflicted upon an
identifiable group of people for the benefit of others.
During World War II, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S.
government imprisoned more than 120,000 Japanese Americans in
456
internment camps. At the end of the war, most of those imprisoned
were paid by the government only $25 and train fare when they were
457
released.
The Japanese internees sought reparations through the
federal government. Fifty years later, the federal government
apologized to the Japanese American community, and paid $20,000
458
to each of 65,000 people in reparations. The Civil Liberties Act of
459
1988 set an important precedent by acknowledging that Japanese
Americans were harmed as a group and therefore should be
compensated as a group, regardless of the length of individual
460
internment or proof of actual harm. Surviving internees and their
461
next of kin are eligible to receive reparations.
This public
recognition of the suffering of a group provides a chance for victims
to mourn their loss and acts as a reminder that abuses of human
462
dignity cannot be ignored.
The Appalachian mountaineers and their descendants are equally
deserving of reparations.
Whereas Japanese Americans were
confined by the U.S. government on the basis of their national origin,
Appalachian miners suffered a slow and agonizing death from Black

(discussing the arguments in favor of paying reparations to African Americans).
456. See John Tateishi & William Yoshino, The Japanese American Incarceration: The
Journey to Redress, HUM. RTS., Spring 2000, at 10 (tracing the history of Japanese
American reparations).
457. See Westley, supra note 454, at 450 (describing the minimal assistance initially
given to Japanese Americans who had been interned during World War II, pursuant
to the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act of 1948, 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 19811987 (1994)).
458. See id. at 451 n.86 (describing the reparative payments made to Japanese
Americans under the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, totaling $1.25 billion).
459. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1989b-1989b-9 (1994).
460. See Westley, supra note 454, at 451 (arguing that while there were some
deficiencies in the government’s implementation of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988,
“the importance of the legislation lies in the precedent established for compensation
of wronged groups within the American system”).
461. See id. at 451 n.88 (noting the fact that compensation to Japanese Americans
was based on group membership, a crucial and groundbreaking aspect of the Civil
Liberties Act of 1988).
462. See id. at 452 (suggesting that such public recognition also allows for
“[m]emorialization” which “symbolizes respect” for loss and injustice suffered);
Yamamoto, supra note 451, at 478 (1998) (describing the profound benefit
reparations provided to many Japanese-American internees who had internalized
blame and doubt regarding discriminatory actions).
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Lung disease, or died in mining disasters, and therefore should be
compensated. The Japanese Americans’ internment was intended to
benefit all Americans by protecting the national security. Similarly,
the harm inflicted on the Appalachian mountaineers was intended to
benefit all Americans by contributing to the industrial development
of this country. Governmental action was involved in both situations,
although less directly in the case of the Appalachian mountaineers.
The government contributed to the plight of the mountaineers by
granting mining permits, broadly interpreting deeds and laws to
benefit the coal operators, denying liability against coal operators in
the courts, and neglecting to enforce stringent health and safety
regulations in the mines.
The German government, German industry, and the United States
formed a joint Foundation to provide a fund of $10 billion (U.S.) in
exchange for the dismissal of pending and future Holocaust slave
463
labor claims cases in U.S. courts. A U.S. District Court in New York
approved a settlement agreement between two Swiss Banks and
Holocaust victims that established a fund of $1.25 Billion (US) in
exchange for the victims releasing the banks and other industry from
464
465
liability. The parties to the Foundation agreement recognized the
legal hurdles faced by the victims, including “justiciability, . . . statutes
of limitation, jurisdictional issues, forum non conveniens, difficulties
466
of proof, and certification of a class of heirs.” Thus, the Foundation
Agreement provided an alternative to the courts by which the harms
suffered by the Holocaust victims could be remedied.

463. See Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility,
and the Future,” July 17, 2000, U.S.-F.R.G., 39 I.L.M. 1298 (entered into force Oct.
19, 2000) (establishing the Foundation, in lieu of the courts, as the exclusive
recourse for all pending and future claims against German companies arising from
the Holocaust and WWII); see also Madeline Doms, Compensation for Survivors of Slave
and Forced Labor: The Swiss Bank Settlement and the German Foundation Provide Options for
Recovery for Holocaust Survivors, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. 171, 193-97 (2001) (describing the
creation and terms of the Foundation as established to make payments to those who
provided slave labor during the Holocaust).
464. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 143-44 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (compensating slave labor survivors, refugees refused entry to Switzerland,
persons who deposited assets in Swiss banks, and survivors whose assets were stolen);
see also Doms, supra note 463, at 174 & n.24 (emphasizing that the settlement
agreement was extraordinary, as most other claims had been dismissed on various
procedural grounds).
465. Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility, and
the Future,” July 17, 2000, U.S.-F.R.G., 34 I.L.M. 1298 (entered into force Oct. 19,
2000).
466. See id. at 1304, annex B, para. 8 (addressing additional equitable
considerations, including the necessity for speedy resolution given the age of the
plaintiffs, and difficulties faced by the heirs of the deceased).
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In discussing the reparations to the Holocaust victims, one scholar
has commented, “when a State or government has through its official
organs—its laws and customs—despoiled and victimized and
murdered a group of its own inhabitants and citizens on the basis of
group membership, that state or its successor in interest has an
unquestionable moral obligation to compensate that group materially
467
By enforcing the broad form deeds and
on the same basis.”
otherwise favoring the coal companies, the U.S. government, through
the courts, has despoiled and victimized the Appalachian
mountaineers and therefore has a moral obligation to compensate
468
them.
The Lakota tribes received a judgment against the United States
now estimated to be worth over $315 million, although they have
469
refused the money. The Lakota instead have demanded the return
470
of the Black Hills to Sioux tribal authority. Royalties amounting to
$300 million per year are owed to other Native Americans for mining,
grazing, oil drilling, and other activities on land owned by Native
471
Americans.
Royalties for use of the Native American land are
required to be paid into a trust fund managed by the Department of
472
the Interior.

467. Westley, supra note 454, at 456. The author describes the principle of
reparations law following the Luxembourg Agreements in September of 1952, and
the impact of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s view of moral duty to compensate for
losses suffered under the previous regime. Id. at 453-57. This view was remarkable,
the author notes, as international law did not require Germany to make reparations,
nor did the Allied Powers put pressure on the Chancellor to make reparations. Id.
Nonetheless, the Luxembourg Agreements became the basis of legislation that
provided reparations to Israel, to the Conference on Jewish Material Claims, and to
individuals. Id.
468. See supra notes 14-26 (chronicling the use of the broad form deed, which
granted not only mineral rights but extensive rights to build, excavate, or damage
lands without liability, and the refusal of the courts to offer remedies).
469. See John P. La Velle, Rescuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice by
Restoring the Great Grasslands and Returning The Sacred Black Hills to the Great Sioux
Nation, 5 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 40, 67-68 (2001) (explaining that “[w]hat
appeared to non-Indians as an expensive and generous settlement of an old land
claim was viewed by the Lakota as just another colonial buyout of Indian title for
which the legal system created a complex justification to legitimate the sale or
expropriation”).
470. See id. (describing the importance of land in Native American culture,
particularly where, as here, the land in question is sacred and plays a significant role
in cultural identity).
471. See Report on the National Academy of Public Administration: The Bureau of Indian
Affairs: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 559, at 97-98,
exh. 2 (2000) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Mona Infield, Supervisory
Computer Specialist, Dep’t of the Interior, Office of Info. Res. Mgmt.) (detailing
checks process, amounts paid, number of account and tract holders, and a managed
balance of $350 million).
472. See Hearing, supra note 471, at 88-89 (statement of Mona Infield) (describing
the Office of Information Resource Management’s primary function as ensuring that
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The Appalachian land has been destroyed by strip mining,
subsidence, acid rain, flooding, and coal dust, and the return of those
473
lands to their rightful owners is not possible. Monetary reparations,
sufficient to begin to repair the damage caused by mining, are
justified and necessary to repair this historical injustice.
Federal funding and grants exceeding $440 million have been paid
474
to Hawaiian natives.
These reparations were deemed justified by
475
the dispossession of native land and attacks on cultural practices.
Reparations for Hawaiians are used to create jobs, training,
education, and improve health programs, similar to the reparations
476
This federal money
suggested for the Appalachian mountaineers.
477
“trickles through the economy, improving conditions for everyone.”
The Appalachian mountaineers similarly need funds for education,
health care, and housing as well as the restoration of their
environment.
Whether reparations are considered compensation to equalize the
status of the Appalachians, or reparations to pay for a historical
injustice, the Appalachians are owed reparations by the beneficiaries
of coal. The federal government should grant reparations to the
Appalachians, following the tradition of funds granted to the
Hawaiians, Native Americans, Japanese Americans, and other groups.
The funding for these reparations should come from the coal
companies who have long benefited from their exploitation of the

payments are made to trust beneficiaries, who “rely on [the] funds to feed, clothe
and house themselves”).
473. See supra notes 88-215 (describing the destruction of lands in Kentucky,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, and the inability of landowners to win redress
in the courts).
474. See Pat Omandam, Hawaiian Funding Tops $440 Million, HONOLULU STARBULLETIN, Mar. 20, 2000 (outlining eight programs providing resources including
family-based and gifted education programs, employment and vocational programs,
elder programs, revolving loan funding, and native languages, faith, and cultural
practice programs), available at http://starbulletin.com/2000/03/20/special/
story3.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2002); Costello, supra note 452, at 832 (noting that
virtually all such programs include a requirement that beneficiaries are of native
Hawaiian ancestry).
475. See generally Costello, supra note 452, at 832-33.
476. Jan TenBruggencate, The State of the Hawaiian, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER,
Jan. 7, 2001, available at http://www.honoluluadvertiser.com/specials/stateof
thehawaiians/index.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2002). See also Omandam, supra note
474 (describing such programs as being at risk after the U.S. Supreme Court ruling
in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), striking down Hawaiian Affairs, the agency
which administers programs designed to benefit Hawaiian citizens who are
descendants of native Hawaiians who were once sovereign peoples); Costello, supra
note 452, at 832-34 (noting that the American overthrow of the Hawaiian
government and seizure of land has had documented detrimental effects on native
Hawaiians in those areas addressed by the targeting programs, whose ancestry
requirements, most agree, served remedial and reparative effects).
477. TenBruggencate, supra note 476.
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coal fields. Tax revenues collected from the coal operators should be
earmarked for use by the Appalachian region.
478
Instead,
Reparations should not be paid to individuals.
reparations should be paid to the local town and county governments
to develop the currently insufficient infrastructure of roads,
passenger rail services, airports, flood control projects, dams, and
other needed services as determined locally. A significant portion of
the funds should be designated for education, to provide alternative
career paths and diversity in industry to eliminate the dependence on
coal.
Harry Caudill has suggested that tourism is one approach for the
revitalization of Appalachia. Caudill argues that the beautiful green
hills and abundant streams can be converted into a tourist attraction
for the northeast metropolitan areas, with dams to make streams into
479
lakes.
Several streams have already been dammed, creating
480
White water
mountain-top lakes available for boating and fishing.
481
rafting excursions have been added to attract tourists. Although a
limited number of tourists have been attracted to Appalachia, the
lack of convenient airports, good highways, and passenger train
482
service has limited the area’s attraction to tourists.
The town of Grundy, Buchanan County, Virginia is an example of
483
A project is
the type of projects that could revitalize Appalachia.
underway to move the commercial center of the town to higher land
to avoid the frequent flooding caused by the mining operations up

478. Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.) reintroduced a bill, as he has done in every
Congress since 1989, in the 107th Congress entitled “Commission to Study
Reparations Proposals for African Americans Act.” See H.R. 40, 107th Cong. (2001):
Because it is my belief that Blacks have been and are harmed as a group,
that racism is a group practice, I am opposed to individual reparations as a
primary policy objective. Obviously, the payment of group reparations
would create the need and opportunity for institution-building that
individual compensation would not. Additionally, beyond any perceived or
real need for Blacks to participate more fully in the consumer market—
which is the inevitable outcome of reparations to individuals—there is a
more exigent need for Blacks to exercise greater control over their
productive labor—which is the possibility created by group reparations.
479. See CAUDILL, supra note 13, at 386 (noting that as the American population
grows and wealth increases, tourism increases to rural areas).
480. See Lynda McDaniels, Ecotourism Takes Off in the “Heart of Appalachia,”
APPALACHIA, May-Aug. 2001 (observing that “tourism is the fastest growing industry in
Southwestern Virginia, with an average annual growth rate of 17 percent”).
481. See generally Virginia is for Lovers, Official Virginia Tourism Website, at
http://www.virginia.org (last visited July 9, 2002).
482. Id.
483. See Francis X. Clines, Town Stakes Out Future On Higher Ground, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2001, at A1 (noting that as the county seat, Grundy hopes to serve as an
example to its region, where coal mining is diminishing and unemployment rising).
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484

river in West Virginia. The Grundy project uses combined funds of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Virginia Department of
485
Transportation.
For a total cost of $177 million, the project
includes a new four-lane highway, destruction of the downtown area,
486
rebuilding a new downtown commercial center, and flood walls.
The new four-lane highway will provide easier access to this remote
town, encouraging businesses to relocate. The destruction of
dilapidated and flood-damaged buildings will eliminate the
depressing appearance. The newly rebuilt downtown will provide
businesses with a modern, planned environment with adequate
parking, walkways, and facilities to encourage customers to make
487
Grundy a destination.
The hope is that Grundy will become an
incubator for high-technology businesses, with the new super-fast
488
wireless internet technology.
Additionally, Grundy has been uplifted by the opening of the
489
Using funds provided by the
Appalachian School of Law in 1997.
county and local individual benefactors, the school currently enrolls
490
250 students, providing reduced or free tuition for local residents.
The school obtained provisional accreditation by the American Bar
491
Association in 2001. A legal career is now possible for people who
492
were formerly forced into mining or leaving.
Other towns in Appalachia could follow the Grundy example,
using federal reparations funding to build universities, colleges, or
trade schools to encourage career alternatives. Pikeville, Kentucky
493
has already successfully completed a flood control project. An $80

484. Id. (describing the 1977 flood which killed three people and caused $15
million in damages).
485. See id. (noting that both agencies were operating under federal mandates,
with the Army Corps of Engineers charged with flood control, and the Department
of Transportation charged with creating a four-lane highway in the area).
486. See id. (adding that the combined project saves millions of dollars in federal
and state funds).
487. Id.
488. See Craig Timberg, Flood-Plagued Town Tries Upward Mobility, WASH. POST, Dec.
28, 2000, at A1 (“[L]eaders imagine nothing less than a total transformation, as a
dingy downtown born of the 19th Century leaps straight to the 21st Century . . . .”).
489. See Laurence Hammack, Buchanan County Seeks Regeneration, ROANOKE TIMES &
WORLD NEWS, Apr. 15, 2001, at B1 (noting that once the school reaches full
enrollment of 350, it is expected to inject more than $10 million per year into the
local economy).
490. See Appalachian School of Law, Financial Assistance, at http://www.asl.edu/
Financial%20Aid/financialaid.htm (last visited June 9, 2002).
491. See Information About Accreditation, available at http://www.asl.edu/
miscinfo/accreditation.htm.
492. Hammack, supra note 489, at B1 (quoting community leaders and citizens
who felt the town had no future without development efforts).
493. Pat Mestern, Country Music Highway Keeps it All Kickin’, NAT’L POST. Dec. 8,
2000, at E10 (describing the Pikeville Kentucky Cut-Thru Project as the most

DAVIS.PRINTER.DOC

966

7/26/2002 12:38 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 905

million project was completed in 1987, re-routing the Levisa River
494
As a result, Pikeville was
and creating 400 acres of usable land.
495
recently included in The 100 Best Small towns in America. Floods
caused by mining affect many Appalachian towns, and these towns
need funds to replace damaged bridges, roads, and buildings, and
relocate to higher ground. Improved highway access and attractive
towns would assist in attracting tourists, businesses, and students to
the area. Tax revenues from coal should be designated to pay for
these improvements, but all taxpayers owe a debt to the Appalachian
mountaineers for their contribution to the industrial development of
this country.
CONCLUSION
Supplying coal to power the industry of this nation has taken a toll
on the land and residents of the coal fields in Appalachia. The
extraction of coal has made a few people and corporations wealthy,
while consigning the majority of residents to poverty, illness, and
ecological devastation. The federal government has set a precedent
by paying reparations to disparaged groups, and should do as much
for the Appalachian mountaineers who have suffered this historical
injustice. Reparations should be delivered to town and county
governments to improve education, transportation, and
infrastructure. Mine owners, as beneficiaries of the coal, should pay
for such reparations.
Payments from all taxpayers are also
appropriate, as all U.S. taxpayers benefited from the Appalachian
mountaineers’ contribution to the industrial development of this
country. Without such funding, Appalachia will continue to be an
eyesore and embarrassment to the rest of the nation. Reparations
could restore these beautiful green hills to their original majesty for
the benefit of all Americans.


impressive “engineering marvel” along the section of U.S. Route 23 between Ohio
and Virginia known as the Country Music Highway).
494. See id. (explaining that the two kilometer channel cut through the mountain
and diverted a fork of the Big Sandy river and required rerouting a railroad).
495. See NORMAN CRAPMTON, THE BEST SMALL TOWNS IN AMERICA: HOW TO FIND A
GREAT LITTLE PLACE AS YOUR NEXT HOME BASE (2002).

